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A CHINA IN THE BULL SHOP?*  
COMPARING THE RHETORIC OF A RISING CHINA 
WITH THE REALITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
LAW OF THE SEA  
Jonathan G. Odom** 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Since the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s and the 
conclusion of Mao Zedong’s reign, the People’s Republic of China (PRC 
                                            
 * The idiom “a bull in a china shop” has long been used to describe “a very clumsy 
creature in a delicate situation.”  Bull in a China Shop Definition, 
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://idioms.thefreedictionary.com/Bull+in+a+China+shop 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2012).  The actual origin of this idiom is unknown, although an early 
use of the phrase can be found in FREDERICK MARRYAT, JACOB FAITHFUL 130 (1895) 
(“I’m like a bull in a china shop.”).  Additionally, a slang English definition of the word 
“bull” includes “empty boastful talk.” See “Bull,” MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/bull. 
 ** Commander Jonathan G. Odom is an active-duty judge advocate in the U.S. Navy. 
Commander Odom earned his Bachelor of Arts with Distinction in History from Duke 
University, his Juris Doctor from Wake Forest University School of Law, and is a 
licensed member of the North Carolina Bar.  Previously, he has served as a legal advisor 
for admirals and generals in the Pentagon, for afloat commanders during operational 
deployments to the Arabian Gulf and the Asia-Pacific region, and for multi-national 
ground force commanders in Iraq and Kosovo.  Of note, he also completed a three-year 
assignment as an international law instructor at the U.S. Naval Justice School, during 
which he also taught international law at the U.S. Naval War College, Surface Warfare 
Officer School, Naval Submarine School, and Naval Chaplains School.  Currently, he is 
serving as the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate (Deputy Legal Advisor) for Commander, 
U.S. Pacific Command, headquartered in Hawaii, with a legal portfolio focused on 
oceans law and policy, the law of armed conflict, and the legal aspects of maritime 
security.  In his personal capacity, Commander Odom has spoken at international and 
U.S. academic forums and has been published on matters related to the law of the sea, the 
law of armed conflict, national security strategy, maritime policy, and homeland defense. 
He can be contacted at jonathan.odom@usa.com.  The views presented are those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the U.S. 
Government, the U.S. Department of Defense, or any of its components. 
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or China) has made progress in its understanding of both domestic and 
international law.1  In the domestic context, China has initiated 
improvements to its statutes and regulations, its law enforcement 
agencies, and its judicial system.2   These steps forward have been offset 
by periodic missteps that have resulted in criticism from external 
organizations, including international human rights groups3 and foreign 
government entities,4 about continuing or lingering deficiencies in 
China’s approach to the law.  Regardless, in comparison to the Mao-era 
legal concepts of “rule by law” and “rule of man,”5 China’s authoritarian 
regime has recently made some positive strides toward what outside 
observers hope could someday reflect a true rule-of-law system.6  
Nevertheless, concerns remain and the proverbial jury is still out on 
                                            
 1. Jamie P. Horsley, Rule of Law in China: Incremental Progress, in THE BALANCE 
SHEET IN 2007 AND BEYOND 94 (C. Fred Bergsten, N. Lardy, B. Gill & D. Mitchell, eds., 
2007), 
https://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Panel%202%20090
212_05rule_of_law.pdf. 
 2. Id. at 94-95. 
 3. See, e.g., AMNESTY INT’L, CHINA ANNUAL REPORT 2011 – THE STATE OF THE 
WORLDS HUMAN RIGHTS, available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/china/report-
2011. 
 4. For a detailed discussion of legal developments in China, see generally CONG. 
EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 112th CONG., ANNUAL REPORT (2011), available at 
http://www.cecc.gov/; for a detailed discussion of human rights developments in China, 
see U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS, available at 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/. 
 5. STANLEY B. LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE:  LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO 88 
(1999) (“Chinese [legal] theory under Mao began from altogether different premises 
[than Western legal theory].  It saw law as the tool of a ruling class placed in the service 
of politics and rejected sharp differentiation among judicial, legal, and administrative 
processes.”); see also BRIAN TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW:  HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
POLITICS 3 (2004).  
Chinese leaders want rule by law, not rule of law . . . The difference . . . is that 
under the rule of law, the law is preeminent and can serve as a check against the 
abuse of power.  Under rule by law, the law can serve as a mere tool for a 
government that suppresses in a legalistic fashion. 
Id. (quoting Chinese law professor Li Shuguang). 
 6. LUBMAN, supra note 5, at 5; Horsley, supra note 1, at 94 (“No one claims that 
today’s China is a ‘rule of law’ country. Nonetheless, most would acknowledge that 
China has moved a long way from the primarily ‘rule of man’ governance approach of 
traditional and Maoist China. This essay suggests that China is also moving beyond the 
instrumental ‘rule by law’ paradigm in which government merely uses law as a tool to 
control society. Instead, China is slowly establishing elements of a ‘rule of law’ system 
that increasingly provides mechanisms also to restrain the arbitrary exercise of state and 
private power and offers the promise, if not the guarantee, that Chinese citizens and other 
actors can assert their rights and interests in reliance on law.”). 
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whether China’s leaders will tolerate domestic legal reforms that would 
bring China’s legal system closer to the liberal model. 
Over the course of the past three decades, China has also made some 
progress in its understanding of international law and acceptance of the 
existing international legal order.  Observers no longer read or hear 
mainstream Chinese legal experts use phrases such as the pejorative, 
Marxist-laden “bourgeois international law.”7  Instead, modern Chinese 
legal scholars recognize the importance of all nations, including China, 
“understand[ing] and abid[ing] by the rules of the international 
community.”8  Perhaps even more importantly, Chinese officials have 
begun to make more progressive statements about international law.9   
In October 2006, the legal committee of the United Nations General 
Assembly discussed the subject of the rule of law.  At that meeting of 
legal experts, Mr. Duan Jielong, the Director-General of the Treaty and 
Law Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, gave a speech 
regarding China’s perspective on international law, during which he 
made several significant representations on the subject.10  First, Mr. 
Duan said that China’s Government “attaches great importance to the 
rule of international law and puts it into actual practice.”11  Then, he 
assured the international audience that China’s Government “faithfully 
fulfills all its obligations under international treaties.”12  Next, he said 
that China’s Government “strictly abides by the provisions and principles 
of international law,”13 and that “relevant international treaties and 
principles of international customary law, as well as the binding 
decisions adopted by the Security Council should all be strictly adhered 
                                            
 7. JEROME A. COHEN & HUNGDAH CHIU, 1 PEOPLE’S CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL 
LAW:  A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 29 (1974). 
 8. Wang Zonglai & Hu Bin, China’s Reform and Opening-Up and International 
Law, 9 CHINESE J. OF INT’L L. 193 (2010) (“Since the adoption of the reform and 
opening-up policy three decades ago, China’s relations with the world have undergone 
historic changes. International law has played a unique role in this process. As no country 
can remain completely isolated from the international system in today’s world, it is 
imperative for countries to understand and abide by the rules of the international 
community.”).  
 9. For example, Mr. Duan Jielong, the Director-General of the Treaty and Law 
Department of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made elaborate statements to the 
international community supporting international law and the international legal order.  
See Duan Jielong, Statement on the Rule of Law at the National and International Levels, 
6 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 185 (2007). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. at 186. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. 
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to,” presumably by all nations.14  With regard to interpreting 
international treaties, Mr. Duan said that “uniform application of 
international law should be ensured” and that such uniform application is 
“essential for the rule of law at the international level.”15  Such 
representations suggested that China has turned a corner in terms of 
understanding international law and accepting the existing international 
legal order. 
A question that the world must consider, however, is whether these 
positive assurances by Chinese officials like Mr. Duan reflect a genuine 
acceptance of international law and the existing international legal order 
or whether such assurances are merely rhetoric.  That question will be 
the focus of this Article, as viewed through the prism of a particular 
subspecialty of international law. 
By its nature, international law can create challenges in any effort to 
assess whether a particular nation accepts the existing international legal 
order.  One complication stems from the multiple sources of law that 
comprise international law.  There is no single source of international 
law, rather it is composed of conventional law, customary law, judicial 
decisions, and learned treatise.16  Moreover, international law covers a 
wide range of activities between nations and organizations, including, 
but not limited to, international trade, international armed conflict, 
human rights, and environmental protection.  Thus, any assessment of a 
nation’s acceptance of international law cannot be accomplished with a 
single, broad-brush stroke or general characterization.  An additional 
complication derives from the fact that a particular nation, such as China, 
might make a deliberate decision to adhere to certain existing rule-sets of 
international law while simultaneously taking a different approach to 
other rule-sets.   
In general, China has indicated its intent to work within existing 
international systems.  For example, in a 2007 report, President Hu Jintao 
stated that China will “work to make the international order fairer and 
more equitable,” implicitly affirming that China will work within the 
existing international legal order.17  Similarly, the Assistant Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Shen Guofang stated in a 2007 speech that   
                                            
 14. Id. at 187. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38 (June 26, 1945), available at 
http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0. 
 17. EVAN MEDEIROS, CHINA’S INTERNATIONAL BEHAVIOR 49 (2009), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG850.pdf (quoting Hu Jintao). 
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China should enhance its ability to determine the agenda and its 
ability to make use of the rules by playing a substantive role in 
all kinds of consultations and the writing of international rules.  
It should show even more initiative in participating in 
international affairs and in building the multilateral system.18 
Thus, the world sees China operating within some specific rule-sets of 
the international legal order, such as rule-sets governing international 
trade.19  
This does not necessarily mean that China has accepted all of the 
rule-sets within the greater body of international law.  In his insightful 
2009 study, China’s International Behavior, China-expert and current-
White House official Dr. Evan S. Medeiros assessed that “[t]here are 
more instances of China gradually accepting international rules than 
objecting to and then trying to revise them (and succeeding).”20  Looking 
ahead, he further concluded that China is “focused far more on working 
within the current rules and institutions to accumulate power and 
influence than on opposing and revising them.”21  Ultimately, however, 
Medeiros recognized that China does not necessarily accept every rule-
set of international law and, additionally, that its actual intent with 
respect to some rule-sets is unclear.22  Medeiros concisely framed the 
bottom-line question as follows: “does China accept the prevailing rules 
or does it seek to rewrite them?”23   
This Article considers the Medeiros question for a particular rule-set 
of international law—namely, the international law of the sea.  
Specifically, it examines China’s rhetoric24 on law of the sea matters in 
                                            
 18. Id. at 42 (quoting Shen Guofeng). 
 19. Wang & Hu, supra note 8, at 194-95.  For an analysis of China’s international 
trade behavior within the WTO system, see U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON CHINA’S WTO COMPLIANCE (2011), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/3189. 
 20. MEDEIROS, supra note 17, at 204. 
 21. Id. at 214. 
 22. Id. at xxi. 
 23. Id. at 223. 
 24. Please note that this Article intentionally focuses upon rhetoric about international 
oceans law that has been derived from official statements and publications of the Chinese 
government, including articles and editorials in official Chinese newspapers.  Some 
Chinese writers have criticized U.S. legal scholars for allegedly “misleading” readers 
about China’s position on law of the sea matters by referencing unofficial articles written 
by Chinese scholars.  See, e.g., Zhang Haiwen, Is It Safeguarding the Freedom of 
Navigation or Maritime Hegemony of the United States?—Comments on Raul (Pete) 
Pedrozo’s Article on Military Activities in the EEZ, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 31, 42 (2010) 
(“In order to illustrate the position of China on the EEZ, Pedrozo’s Article (paras.13-15) 
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recent years, along with its official actions and the realities of the law of 
the sea, and assesses whether China accepts the prevailing rules or seeks 
to rewrite them.  Part II of this Article identifies some fundamental 
realities of the law of the sea, which helps frame the remainder of the 
discussion.  Part III considers whether China’s policy preferences are 
met by those realities, and identifies China’s options for ameliorating any 
disconnects between those preferences and realities.  Part IV examines 
some specific uses of rhetoric by China on law of the sea matters and 
evaluates the validity of that rhetoric.  Part V discusses some potential 
concerns about China’s use of this rhetoric and Part VI provides some 
specific recommendations on how China could reassure the world of its 
intentions on matters governed by the law of the sea.  In the end, this 
Article will answer the Medeiros question and conclude whether or not 
China accepts this body of international law.   
II.  FUNDAMENTAL REALITIES OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 
Before examining China’s rhetoric about law of the sea matters, let 
us first identify some fundamental realities of the law of the sea.  These 
realities include general truths about the law of the sea, as well as 
specific concepts, rules, authority, rights, obligations, responsibilities, 
and limitations reflected in that body of law. 
                                                                                                  
refers to two articles of Chinese scholars. Pedrozo neither refers to Chinese official 
documents, nor checked the positions expressed by the competent ocean administrative 
authorities of the Chinese government or the naval authorities. To base one’s 
interpretation of China’s position on such sources reflects inadequate research at best, an 
attempt to mislead readers at worst.”).  The author of that criticism, Zhang Haiwen, is the 
Deputy Director-General of the China Institute for Marine Affairs (CIMA).  Id. at 31 
n.31.  CIMA is a “research arm” of the State Oceanic Administration (P.R.C.).  Sponsors 
and Organizers, SECOND INST. OF OCEANOGRAPHY, 
http://www.sio.org.cn/english/symposium/Organizers_and_Sponsors.asp (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012).  Of course, Zhang includes a disclaimer in the introductory footnote of 
that article that states: “Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s personal 
academic views.”  Zhang, supra, at 31 n.31.  Ironically, Dr. Zhang either misses a 
constructive opportunity or deliberately opts to avoid identifying or cataloging Chinese 
official documents that state and justify China’s position on these matters.   Thus, in 
many situations, outside observers like Professor Pedrozo have no option but to rely upon 
what Chinese scholars have written.  In order to avoid similar criticism, this Article 
attempts to focus upon analyzing only official statements and publications of China. 
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A.  Law of the Sea as International Law 
The law of the sea is a subfield of international law.  That reality, 
while simple and obvious, carries with it several significant legal effects 
that vary depending upon the source of international law, be it 
conventional law or customary law.   
First, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how the 
law is interpreted.  Much of the law of the sea is reflected in the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).25  Nations must 
interpret UNCLOS as they would any other international treaty, 
convention, or agreement.26  Specifically, the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties requires nations to interpret rules of international 
conventions, including those of UNCLOS, “in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose.”27  If the ordinary 
meaning of a convention’s rule is “ambiguous or obscure,” then nations 
may rely upon “supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion.”28  
These basic rules of treaty interpretation are understandable and prudent:  
the text of a treaty or convention often reflects years of intense and 
deliberative negotiations between sovereign nations, often involving the 
efforts and accommodating the interests of many nations.  If the 
established rules of treaty interpretation are casually ignored, then one 
nation or a discrete minority of nations could upset the will of the 
majority of state-parties to a treaty or convention.  In effect, a minority 
would be able to unilaterally renegotiate the original bargain long after 
the parties have all departed the negotiating table. 
Second, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how 
the rules of law are modified.  As an international convention, UNCLOS 
is subject to the standard rules of formation and modification governing 
any other treaty, convention, or agreement.29  For example, if a situation 
arises that was unforeseen at the time a convention was negotiated, the 
parties may negotiate a modification or amendment to the convention—
but those situations require adherence to strict procedures.30  Taken 
                                            
 25. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 
397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 26. See generally Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. 
 27. Id. art. 31(1). 
 28. Id. art. 32.  
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. arts. 39-41. 
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together, these rules of formation, modification, and interpretation of 
treaty law are intended to promote “maintenance of international peace 
and security, the development of friendly relations and the achievement 
of cooperation among nations.”31  In layman’s terms, a single nation may 
not casually and unilaterally reinterpret provisions of a treaty or 
convention merely because that nation subsequently experiences 
“buyer’s remorse.”32 
Third, the law of the sea’s status as international law affects how 
uncodified, customary rules of law are developed.  While much of the 
law of the sea is reflected in UNCLOS, an important portion of that body 
of international law is derived from custom and state practice.33  In many 
ways, customary international law is a reflection of world history.34  This 
includes both centuries of world history that predated the negotiation and 
conclusion of UNCLOS as well as the three decades of modern history 
after its conclusion.  The practices of nations—both actions and 
inactions—thus shed light on the real meaning of the provisions of 
UNCLOS.35  Therefore, if a nation fails to participate or deliberately opts 
not to participate in an era of world history, then it is extremely difficult 
for that nation to subsequently question or challenge the developments of 
customary international law that might have occurred during that period 
of time.  
B.  Specific Rights and Responsibilities of Coastal States and User States 
Under the international law of the sea regime, the authority, rights, 
obligations, responsibilities, and limitations of individual states are 
defined by certain concepts, rules, and tenets that are also worth 
identifying at the outset of this discussion.   
First, coastal states are entitled to draw baselines along their coasts.36  
In general, coastal states must draw their baselines at the low-water line 
along their coasts.37  Alternatively, coastal states may draw straight 
baselines along their coastlines, but only in four limited situations:  (1) 
                                            
 31. Id. at preamble. 
 32. See Gerald D. Bell, The Automobile Buyer After the Purchase, 31 J. MARKETING 
12 (1967), for an explanation of the concept of “buyer’s remorse.”  
 33. See ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 6-11 (Dominic 
McGoldrick ed., 3d ed. 1999). 
 34. See id. at 6-13. 
 35. See id. at 7-11 (noting that customary international law is reflected in state 
practice). 
 36. UNCLOS, supra note 25, arts. 7-10. 
 37. Id. art. 5. 
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where the state’s “coastline is deeply indented and cut into,”38 (2) “if 
there is a fringe of islands along the [state’s] coast in its immediate 
vicinity,”39 (3) “if a river flows directly into the sea,”40 or (4) if the state 
has a juridical bay.41  In these limited situations, however, the “straight 
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general 
direction of the [state’s] coast.”42  Moreover, there must be a sufficiently 
close link between the sea areas lying within the straight baselines and 
the land domain of the coastal state.43 
Second, coastal states may claim historic waters only if three criteria 
are satisfied.44  One, a coastal state must demonstrate an “effective 
exercise of sovereignty” over the waters as internal waters.45  Two, the 
coastal state must demonstrate that this exercise of authority in the 
waters has been continuous “during a considerable time so as to have 
developed into a usage.”46 Three, the coastal state must demonstrate that 
the claim has received the “general toleration” or “acquiescence” of other 
states.47  If any of these criteria are not satisfied, the coastal state lacks a 
legitimate basis under international law to assert a claim of historic 
waters.48 
Third, warships of user states enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial seas of a coastal state.49  UNCLOS recognizes that 
ships of “all States enjoy a right of innocent passage.”50  Moreover, that 
right is enjoyed by “all ships,”51 including vessels and submarines52 that 
are capable of engaging in military-unique activities.  It therefore follows 
that the right of innocent passage also is afforded to military vessels—so 
                                            
 38. Id. art. 7(1). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. art. 9. 
 41. Id. art.10. 
 42. Id. art. 7(3). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, [1964] 2 Y.B. Int’l 
L. Comm’n 13, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1962/Add.1, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/ 
publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1962_v2_e.pdf. See also CHURCHILL & 
LOWE, supra note 33, at 43-44. 
 45. Juridical Regime of Historic Waters, Including Historic Bays, supra note 44, at 
25. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 25-26. 
 49. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 17. 
 50. Id. art. 17. 
 51. See id. arts. 17-26. 
 52. Id. art. 20. 
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long as those transiting vessels do not engage in military activities while 
passing through the coastal state’s territorial seas. 53  In fact, UNCLOS 
enumerates a specific set of rules for innocent passage that is applicable 
to warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial 
purposes.54  Although coastal states may suspend temporarily the right of 
innocent passage, they may not discriminate “in form or in fact among 
foreign ships” when exercising their suspension power.55  Finally, 
coastal states may not “impose requirements on foreign ships which have 
the practical effect of denying or impairing the right of innocent 
passage.”56 
Fourth, coastal states have some limited authority to control 
activities in their contiguous zones.57  In particular, coastal states may 
exercise control to prevent infringement of four—and only four—
categories of laws and regulations: customs, fiscal, immigration, and 
sanitary.58  Of note, these categories do not include an authority to 
generally exercise control necessary for “security.”59 
Fifth, coastal states do not enjoy “sovereignty” in their exclusive 
economic zones like they do in their territorial seas and internal waters. 60  
Instead, coastal states only enjoy “sovereign rights” in their exclusive 
economic zones.61  These sovereign rights are not unlimited in nature,62 
but instead, are confined to “sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring 
and exploiting, conserving and managing the natural resources . . . with 
regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of 
the zone . . . .”63  As indicated by the plain language of the name itself, 
the zone is an exclusive economic zone—not an exclusive security zone 
or an exclusive military zone.64  In fact, when some nations at the 
UNCLOS negotiations attempted to insert an enforceable “security 
                                            
 53. Id. art. 19(2) (the list of activities includes:  using force, exercising or practicing 
weapons, collecting intelligence, transmitting propaganda, launching, landing or taking 
on board aircraft, launching, landing, or taking on board any military device, or jamming 
communication systems of the coastal state). 
 54. Id. arts. 29-32. 
 55. Id. art. 25(3). 
 56. Id. art. 24(1)(a). 
 57. Id. art. 33.  
 58. Id. art. 33(a). 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. arts. 2, 56. 
 61. Id. art. 56. 
 62. See id. art. 55. 
 63. Id. art. 56(1). 
 64. See id. Part V. 
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interest” into the exclusive economic zone regime, that proposal was 
deliberately considered and rejected by the nations assembled.65 
Sixth, user states may conduct military activities in the exclusive 
economic zones of coastal states.66  For centuries of world history, 
nations have enjoyed freedom of the seas beyond the territorial seas of 
any coastal state.67  These freedoms have included the collecting of 
                                            
 65. II United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982:  A Commentary 558-
560 (Satya N. Nandan and Shabtai Rosenne, eds. 2002); see also Third United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Montego Bay, Jam., Note by the Secretariat, 243-4, 
U.N. DOC. A/CONF. 62/WS/37 (Dec. 10 1982), 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/diplomaticconferences/lawofthesea-
1982/docs/vol_XVII/a_conf-62_ws_37%20and%20add-1%20and%202.pdf  
(“This [exclusive economic zone] concept, as set forth in the Convention, recognizes the 
interest of the coastal State in the resources of the zone and authorizes it to assert 
jurisdiction over resource-related activities therein. At the same time, all States continue 
to enjoy in the zone traditional high seas freedoms of navigation and overflight and the 
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other  internationally lawful uses of the sea 
related to these freedoms, which remain qualitatively and quantitatively the same as those 
freedoms when exercised seaward of the zone. Military operations, exercises and 
activities have always been regarded as internationally lawful uses of the sea. The right to 
conduct such activities will continue to be enjoyed by all States in the exclusive 
economic zone. This is the import of article 58 of the Convention.”). 
 66. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art 58(1). 
 67. See William J. Clinton, Message From the President of the United States: Letter of 
Transmittal, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39, at 3-4 (1994), reprinted in 6 BUREAU OF PUBLIC 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 6 DISPATCH SUPPLEMENT, SUPP. 1 (1995), 
http://www.jag.navy.mil/organization/documents/Senate_Transmittal.pdf [hereinafter 
Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal]; see also 66 J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, 
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1994: EXCESSIVE MARITIME 
CLAIMS 242 (1994); Raul “Pete” Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: 
The Right to Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHINESE 
J. OF INT’L L. 9, 14 (2010) [hereinafter Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights]. 
Similarly, military surveillance ships have historically collected intelligence 
seaward of the territorial sea as a matter of routine. During the Cold War, for 
example, Soviet surveillance ships (AGI) routinely collected intelligence on US 
and NATO warships at sea. Such surveillance activities were lawful and 
acceptable to the Alliance so long as they occurred seaward of the territorial sea 
and the AGIs complied with the obligations of the 1972 International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS) and the 1972 US–USSR Agreement 
on the Prevention of Incidents on the High Seas (INCSEA). . . . Military aircraft 
have likewise flown thousands of missions beyond national airspace since the 
advent of aviation, to include intelligence collection missions and military 
exercises along the outer edge of the territorial sea. These activities were 
commonplace during the Cold War and continue today without the consent of the 
coastal States concerned. For instance, from May 2007 to May 2008, Russian TU-
95 Bear bombers conducted operational flights just outside the 12-nm limit off 
Alaska and Canada on many occasions. US and Canadian fighters intercepted and 
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intelligence and the conducting of surveillance by militaries.68  The text 
of UNCLOS expressly provides user states with the freedoms of 
navigation and overflight and “other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to these freedoms.”69  Additionally, that same provision 
includes the language “such as,” a phrase the ordinary meaning of which 
denotes examples, but not necessarily an exhaustive list.70  To that end, it 
was “the general understanding” of the UNCLOS negotiators that this 
language would permit “foreign military activities” in the exclusive 
economic zones of coastal states.71  During the three decades of modern 
                                                                                                  
monitored the bombers, but each time the Russian aircraft were allowed to 
continue on their way. 
Id. at 14-15. 
 68. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 67, at 242. 
 69. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 58(1).  
 70. Id. See Elliot L. Richardson, Power, Mobility and the Law of the Sea, 58 FOREIGN 
AFF. 902, 916 (1980) (In order to carry out the qualitative aspect of this understanding, 
the text identifies the safeguarded freedoms as those ‘referred to in Article 87,’ which is 
the article on “Freedom of the High Seas.”  The quantitative aspect is satisfied by the 
phrase ‘such as,’ which makes clear that the reference to specific uses is illustrative but 
not exhaustive.  Article 87 similarly defines ‘freedom of the high seas’ by setting forth a 
non-exhaustive list of freedoms.).  Ambassador Richardson was the head of the U.S. 
Delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.  Id. at 902.  Of note, he 
was the originator of the “other internationally lawful uses of the seas related to these 
freedoms, such as” language that was ultimately codified in the final text of Article 58(1).  
See Jorge Casteneda, Negotiations on the Exclusive Economic Zone at the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, in ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR 
OF JUDGE MANFRED LACHS 603 (1984). 
The maritime powers’ misgivings, concerning the restrictive character of the 
phrase ‘other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and 
communications,’ were dispelled through the inclusion of a new formulation, 
proposed by the representatives of the  U.S., Ambassador Elliot Richardson, which 
reads as follows:  “Other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms, such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircraft and 
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provisions of the 
Convention.” 
Id. at 622.  Ambassador Castaneda was the head of the Mexico delegation to the Third 
U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea.  CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION:  THE UNITED 
STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 302-03 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1984) 
[hereinafter CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION].  
 71. CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION, supra note 70, at 302-303. 
Koh:  The question of military activities in the exclusive economic zone is a very 
difficult one.  Bernie Oxman will remember that the status of the exclusive 
economic zone was one of the last questions to be wrapped up in the negotiations 
in Committee Two.  We finally succeeded in wrapping up this question of the 
status of the exclusive economic zone thanks to the personal initiative of our friend 
Jorge Castaneda of Mexico.  Before he became foreign minister, he was the leader 
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history after the negotiation of UNCLOS, naval forces of the world have 
continued to conduct non-economic, military activities beyond the 
territorial seas of any coastal state, including within the exclusive 
economic zones of those coastal states.72  Consequently, an 
overwhelming majority of nations in the world have either openly 
supported this freedom of the seas or taken no state action to restrict 
foreign military activities in their respective exclusive economic zones.73   
III.  FACED WITH THESE REALITIES, CHINA OPTS FOR RHETORIC 
The realities of international law, including the law of the sea, do not 
support many of China’s desired positions.  In other words, the meaning 
and intent of many key provisions of UNCLOS are not what China 
wishes they were, and the status of customary law of the sea is not where 
China wants it to be.  For example, China wants to be able to draw 
                                                                                                  
of the Mexican delegation.  In 1977, I believe, Jorge Castaneda invited about 20 of 
us to dinner one evening.  After dinner was over, he asked that the table be cleared 
and said, “Ladies and gentlemen, we have been grappling for the last three years 
with the question of the status of the exclusive economic zone.   I have invited you 
here because I believe you represent a cross section of the points of view of the 
Conference and you are the leaders of the Conference.  I suggest, if you all agree, 
that we commence informal consultations on this question.”  We agreed and sat 
down and worked, in fact, all night long.  And we began to negotiate every night 
for two weeks and eventually wrapped up the issue.  The solution in the 
Convention text is very complicated.  Nowhere is it clearly stated whether a third 
state may or may not conduct military activities in the exclusive economic zone of 
a coastal state.  But, it was the general understanding that the text we negotiated 
and agreed upon would permit such activities to be conducted.  I therefore would 
disagree with the statement made in Montego Bay by Brazil, in December 1982, 
that a third state may not conduct military activities in Brazil’s exclusive economic 
zone. 
Id. at 302-03 (quoting Ambassador Tommy Koh) (emphasis added).  Ambassador Koh 
from Singapore was the second and final president of the Third U.N. Conference on the 
Law of the Sea, presiding over the conclusion of the UNCLOS text; he made that 
statement a mere thirteen months after the final text of UNCLOS was concluded. 
 72. See Captain Raul Pedrozo, Close Encounters at Sea: the USNS Impeccable 
Incident, 62 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 101, 102 (2009). 
 73. For a collection of Declarations and Statements issued by coastal states upon 
acceding to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. of Oceans Aff. and the Law of the Sea, Declarations 
and Statements (July 12, 2011), http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm [hereinafter Declarations and 
Statements].  For a summary of these national maritime claims by coastal states 
throughout the world, see U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DOD 2005. 1-M, MARITIME CLAIMS 
REFERENCE MANUAL (2005) [hereinafter MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL]. 
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straight baselines along its entire coastline74 and claim the significant 
amounts of resulting enclosed waters as off-limits to the ships of other 
nations.75  Additionally, China wants to be able to draw straight 
baselines around the Paracel Islands and claim even more internal 
waters.76  Still unsatisfied, China wants “indisputable sovereignty” and 
“historic rights” over eighty percent of the South China Sea with its nine 
unexplained dashes.77  Regarding the rights, freedoms, and uses of the 
sea, China wishes that foreign warships did not have the right of innocent 
passage.78  China also wants to control security in its contiguous zone.79  
                                            
 74. See Declaration of the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Baselines of the Territorial Sea (May 15, 1996) http://www.un.org/depts/los/ 
LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/CHN_1996_Declaration.pdf (last visited 
Feb. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea]. 
 75. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 1992, effective Feb. 25, 1992), art. 2, available at 
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/12/content_1383846.htm [hereinafter 
Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone]. 
 76. Declaration on the Baselines of the Territorial Sea, supra note 74.  
 77. See Letter from Permanent Mission of China to H.E. Mr. Ban Ki-Moon, 
Secretary-General, United Nations (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.un.org/ 
depts/los/clcs_new/submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/chn_2009re_mys_vnm_e.pdf; see 
Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and Continental Shelf (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 26, 1998, effective June 26, 1998, art. 14, 
available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383573.htm 
(“The provisions in this Law shall not affect the rights that the People’s Republic of 
China has been enjoying ever since the days of the past.”). 
 78. See Tao Cheng, Communist China and the Law of the Sea, 63 AM. J. INT’L L. 47, 
63 (1969) (The 1958 Declaration on China’s Territorial Sea “requires permission for 
foreign vessels to exercise the right of innocent passage” whereas “the Geneva 
Convention [on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of 1958] does not.”); see 
also Yann-Huei “Billy” Song, China and the Military Use of the Ocean, 20 OCEAN DEV. 
& INT’L L. 213, 216 (1990).  
Because of failure to make passage of warships through territorial sea dependent 
on the coastal states’ prior notification or authorization as well as because of the 
adoption of a provision giving “ships” as such in general the right of innocent 
passage through the territorial sea in the 1977 Informal Composite Negotiating 
Text, Shen Wei-liang, chairman of the Chinese delegation to the seventh session of 
the UNCLOS III, stated that “[T]he system of passage in territorial seas is an 
important and fundamental issue relating to the coastal states” sovereignty and 
security. All kinds of regulations in that regard must ensure that the sovereignty of 
the coastal state is not infringed and security not threatened. For the sake of the 
convenience for international trade, a system of innocent passage basically can be 
accepted. However, it is up to the decision of the coastal states, based on its laws 
and regulations, whether to entitle military vessels the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial seas. Without giving prior notification or receiving the 
coastal states “laws and regulations, the passage of foreign warships through the 
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territorial sea constructs an act of infringement on the coastal states’ independence 
and security, which can never be permitted.”  During the final stages of UNCLOS 
III, the Chinese delegates continued to propose the incorporation of the 
requirement of prior notification and authorization into the draft Convention on the 
Law of the Sea, but without avail.  
Id.  See also Declarations and Statements, supra note 73; Law on the Territorial Sea and 
Contiguous Zone, supra note 75, art. 6; JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA AND THE LAW OF 
THE SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT 38-39 (1979) (“Chinese representatives have been 
adamant concerning this principle of non-innocent passage for military vessels through 
territorial seas and particularly straits, and all statements indicate a resolute intention 
never to compromise it.”); Michael Carr, China and the Law of the Sea Convention, 9 
AUSTL. J. OF CHINESE AFF. 35, 35-36 (1983).  
Section 3 of the Convention clearly recognizes the right of all ships, including 
warships, to “innocent passage” through the territorial sea.  Passage is innocent so 
long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, order or security of the coastal state 
(Article 19).  China, however, takes a more restrictive view of this right of 
navigation.  Foreign non-military vessels can have the right of innocent passage 
but “must observe the relevant laws and regulations laid down by the Government 
of the People’s Republic of China.”  Foreign military vessels must obtain prior 
authorization for passage. . . . That the passage of warships may be innocent was 
clearly established by the International Court of Justice in the Corfu Channel Case; 
the Chinese maintain, however, that from the point of view of security this is never 
so. . . . It is clear that the Chinese are unlikely to concede the right of innocent 
passage of warships through their territorial sea.  However, if they sign and then 
ratify the Convention, they will have to reconcile their stand on this issue with 
their newly assumed international obligations. 
Id. at 37-38.  See also Zhiguo Gao, China and the Law of the Sea, in FREEDOM OF SEAS, 
PASSAGE RIGHTS, AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION  273, 284-85 (Myron H. 
Nordquist, Tommy K.B. Koh & John Norton Moore, eds., 2009) (“It is China’s view that 
only non-military vessels were entitled to the right of innocent passage; no consensus had 
been reached on the innocent passage of warships.”  Additionally, “[a] Chinese writer 
recently asserted that the general customary rule on the passage of warships through the 
territorial sea is: ‘Coastal States may grant foreign warships innocent passage through the 
territorial sea without special requirements or make the passage subject to previous 
notification or authorization, or to some other requirements.’”  While “[t]his assertion 
may be true in theory and practice[,]” it is nevertheless “contrary to the provisions of 
UNCLOS” and “[t]herefore poses a major problem for China if it wishes to stay within 
the framework of the Convention.”).  Of note, at the time Gao wrote this chapter, he was 
the Executive Director of the China Institute for Marine Affairs, a research arm of 
China’s State Oceanic Administration.  Currently, Gao is a judge on the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.  See Judge Zhiguo Gao, INT’L TRIBUNAL FOR LAW OF 
THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=92 (last visited Feb. 11, 2012). 
 79. Law on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra note 75, art. 13; Carr, 
supra note 78, at 41. 
China was an early supporter of such a zone, and also recognized claims for the 
establishment of extensive zones for such purposes as peace and security.  These 
zones would have represented an infringement of the rights of innocent passage 
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China wishes that a coastal state enjoyed sovereignty of its exclusive 
economic zone equivalent to that which it enjoys over its territorial seas 
and internal waters, versus merely having sovereignty rights.80  China 
also wishes that coastal states enjoyed legally-protected and enforceable 
security interests in their respective exclusive economic zones.81  Finally, 
China wishes that it enjoyed 200 nautical mile territorial seas,82 that 
other states enjoyed only a limited freedom of passage through its 
exclusive economic zone,83 and that other states be prohibited from 
conducting military activities in its exclusive economic zone.84   
                                                                                                  
and transit passage and of the doctrine of freedom of the high seas and were 
rejected by the [Third U.N.] Conference. 
Id. 
 80. See, e.g., Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, CHINADAILY.COM.CN, 
Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/10/content_7564839.htm 
(This article reported the following statement by Major General Wang Dengping’s, the 
political commissar of the Armament Department of the People’s Liberation Army Navy, 
regarding the USNS Impeccable incident: “It is our sovereignty for Chinese vessels to 
conduct activities in the country’s special economic zone, and such activities are 
justified.”).  For more information on the USNS Impeccable incident, see generally 
Jonathan G. Odom, The True “Lies” of The Impeccable Incident: What Really Happened, 
Who Disregarded International Law, and Why Every Nation (Outside of China) Should 
be Concerned, 18 MICH. ST.  J. INT’L L. 411 (2010). 
 81. See Spokesman Zhu Bangzao Gives Full Account of the Collision between US and 
Chinese Military planes, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERV., Apr. 4, 2001, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010404/393124A.htm. 
 82. GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 56 (“While having always stressed the distance of 
twelve miles in respect of [China’s] own territorial waters, [China] has continued to 
support a maximum breadth of two hundred miles.”); Carr, supra note 78, at 35-36. 
 83. See, e.g., Violation of China’s Sovereignty Never Allowed, supra note 80 
(Regarding the issue of foreign military activities, Major General Wang stated, “Innocent 
passage by naval vessels from other countries in the territorial waters in the special 
economic zone is acceptable, but not allowed otherwise.”); see also Huang Zuoping, 
Troubled Waters, BEIJING REVIEW, June 7, 2009, 
http://www.bjreview.com.cn/world/txt/2009-06/07/content_199369.htm (“These 
navigation rights refer to ‘innocent passage,’ on which point the U.S. Navy obviously 
cannot stand. Therefore, it is necessary and perfectly justifiable for China to dispel U.S. 
Navy surveillance ships from its EEZs to protect its marine environment and resources.”). 
 84. Ma Zhaoxu, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (P.R.C.), Regular Press 
Conference, Mar. 10, 2009, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t541713.htm 
(“[Engaging] in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in the South China Sea 
without China’s permission, [the US navy surveillance ship] broke the international law 
as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”); see also China Opposes Any Military Acts in 
Its Exclusive Economic Zone Without Permission, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERV., Nov. 
26, 2010, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-11/26/c_13624036.htm 
(quoting Hong Lei, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (P.R.C.) as saying “We hold 
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Recognizing the significant number of disconnects between reality 
and China’s preferences, the question becomes:  What are China’s 
options for realizing its goals?   
One option, since foreclosed, would have been for China to decline 
binding itself as a signatory to UNCLOS.  A fundamental principle of 
international law is that treaties are based upon the “free consent”85 of 
the parties—no nation can be forced to enter a particular treaty or 
convention.86  In fact, not every nation in the world is a party to 
UNCLOS.87  China, however, chose the path of compromise and 
voluntarily ratified UNCLOS in 1996.88  This decision, while laudable, 
does not ipso facto immunize China from criticism when it acts 
inconsistent with the terms of the convention.  To the contrary, China’s 
ratification of UNCLOS increases the international community’s 
expectations that China will abide by its terms. 
A second option, also now foreclosed, would have been for China to 
submit declarations upon ratifying UNCLOS that addressed its 
disconnects with the UNCLOS regime.  Although UNCLOS, unlike 
many other treaties and conventions,89 expressly prohibits member-states 
from submitting reservations upon ratification,90 it does permit the 
submission of declarations or statements.91  Thus, many nations have 
                                                                                                  
a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue. We oppose any party to take any military 
acts in our exclusive economic zone without permission.”); Zuoping, supra note 83. 
 85. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 26, at preamble. 
 86. Id. art. 52. 
 87. For a list of the 162 nations that have acceded to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. For 
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, Chronological lists of ratifications of, accessions and 
successions to the Convention and the related Agreements as at 03 June 2011, UN.ORG, 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ratifications.htm last 
visited Apr. 16 2012). Nations that have not yet acceded to UNCLOS include:  
Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Iran, Ireland, Lichtenstein, 
Niger, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.  Id.  The United States, 
however, has long considered the legal regime reflected in UNCLOS to be customary 
law.  See Statement on United States Ocean Policy, 1 Pub. Papers 378, 378-79 (Mar. 10, 
1983). 
 88. See Gao, supra note 78, at 278 (“Due to the comprehensiveness of the LOS 
Convention and its spirit of compromise, no State is completely satisfied with all the 
provisions.  Every country has to cede on one point before gaining on another.  So despite 
its dissatisfaction with some of the articles to the Convention, China ratified it in 1996.”); 
Declarations Upon Ratification of UNCLOS (P.R.C.) (June 7, 1996), 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm#China. 
 89. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 26, art. 19. 
 90. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 309. 
 91. Id. art. 310. 
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submitted declarations at their respective times of accession.92  
Unfortunately, some of those declarations look very similar to 
reservations and, therefore, have questionable effect.  In fact, China 
submitted several declarations at the time it joined UNCLOS, including 
one regarding the right of innocent passage afforded to foreign 
warships.93  That notwithstanding, China failed to submit declarations on 
other significant issues, including attempts to restrict foreign military 
activities in China’s exclusive economic zone94 as a handful of other 
states have done.95  Recently, PRC officials have started to use rhetoric, 
such as “[w]e hold a consistent and clear-cut stance on the issue,”96 
implying that China’s position on the issue of foreign military activities 
in its exclusive economic zone has been long-standing.  In reality, 
however, China did not publicly adopt that stance until years after it 
acceded to UNCLOS.97  In essence, despite China’s affinity for past 
events over a span of 5,000 years, it does not acknowledge the legal 
significance of events over the past forty years in world history and 
international law—including its actions and, in this case, inaction.    
A third option is for China to pursue the invalidation of UNCLOS.  
Less than a century ago, China waged a rhetorical battle of invalidation 
on a significant number of bilateral treaties and conventions that it had 
entered into during the 1800s.  Believing these agreements to be 
unfavorable to China’s interests, China successfully employed the novel 
                                            
 92. See Declarations Upon Ratification of UNCLOS, supra note 88. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id.  
 95. See id. For example, Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Uruguay 
submitted Declarations at the time of their accession to UNCLOS that claimed the right 
to restrict military activities in their respective exclusive economic zones; however, 
Germany, Italy, and Netherlands submitted Declarations that coastal states lacked the 
right to do so. Id. 
 96. China Opposes Any Military Acts in Its Exclusive Economic Zone Without 
Permission, supra note 86 (Quoting Hong Lei, Spokesman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(P.R.C.). 
 97. During the negotiations of UNCLOS, China was apparently silent on the specific 
issue of foreign military activities in a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone.  See, e.g., 
Carr, supra note 78, at 40 (“The nature of this exclusive jurisdiction has been defined by 
China as ‘the right of the coastal States to protect, use and exploit all the natural 
resources in the zone, to adopt necessary measures and regulations to prevent those 
resources being plundered, encroached on, damaged or polluted, and to exercise overall 
control and regulation of the  marine environment and scientific research within the 
zone.’”); see also Brian Wilson, An Avoidable Maritime Conflict:  Disputes Regarding 
Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 41 J. OF MAR. L. & COMMERCE 421, 
429-30 (2010). 
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doctrine of “unfair treaties” 98 to abandon them.  However, the likelihood 
of success in a similar battle against UNCLOS is drastically lower.  
Unlike the “unfair treaties” of the 1800s, UNCLOS is not a bilateral 
agreement, but rather a multilateral one with 162 other state-parties 
whom China would need to convince of its invalidity.  Politically, 
international relations during the 1920s are significantly different than 
modern international relations.  Assuming arguendo that China was an 
“unequal party” at the time of the 19th century agreements, China is 
hardly an “unequal party” with respect to UNCLOS.  The multilateral 
agreement reached in UNCLOS was not a forced deal between unequal 
nations, but rather the result of equal bargaining among participating 
nations of all sizes and influence.  Consequently, China would be hard 
pressed to resurrect its “unfair treaty” strategy from the 1920s and 
invalidate UNCLOS on such grounds, without generating further 
international concern over whether China accepts the existing 
international legal order. 
A fourth option is for China to unilaterally withdrawal from 
UNCLOS.  Just as entering a treaty or convention is based upon the “free 
consent” of the parties, international law affords state-parties the right to 
withdraw from a particular treaty or convention.99  By the express terms 
of UNCLOS, the right of denunciation is available to state-parties.100  
However, China is highly unlikely to denunciate, as this too would 
generate further international concern over whether China truly accepts 
the existing international legal order. 
A fifth option is for China to pursue amending UNCLOS.  Like the 
standard procedures for amending other treaties and conventions,101 
UNCLOS fully contemplated that the Convention might need to be 
modified in the future.102  By the express terms of the Convention, a 
party may propose specific amendments and request the convening of a 
conference to consider such proposed amendments.103  If less than a 
majority of UNCLOS state-parties (currently, 82 of 162) do not reply 
favorably within twelve months of a proposed amendment, then the U.N. 
Secretary-General will not convene a conference to consider the 
proposed amendments.104  Because fewer than eighty-two state-parties 
                                            
 98. For a comprehensive discussion of this historical movement, see generally DONG 
WANG, CHINA’S UNEQUAL TREATIES:  NARRATING NATIONAL HISTORY (2005). 
 99. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 27, arts. 54, 56. 
 100. UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 317. 
 101. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, art. 32. 
 102. See UNCLOS, supra note 25, art. 312. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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support China’s preferences on these law of the sea matters,105 it is 
unlikely that China could succeed in having any proposed amendments 
to UNCLOS seriously considered. 
With these five options off the table, China appears to be pursuing a 
sixth option. This option consists of using rhetoric designed to allow 
China to retain the benefits of the provisions it likes, while repudiating 
those it does not.  For those UNCLOS rules that China dislikes but 
cannot legally or politically reserve-, declare-, invalidate-, withdraw-, or 
amend-away, it must create and encourage doubt in the meaning of those 
rules.  Accordingly, China argues that the text of UNCLOS is flawed.  
For example, at the final session of UNCLOS negotiations, the head of 
China’s delegation stated that “[t]here are still quite a number of articles 
in the Convention which are imperfect or even have serious drawbacks.  
We are not entirely satisfied with the Convention.”106  More recently, in 
regard to the exclusive economic zone regime, China has argued that the 
regime has “shortcomings” that lead to “unclear and differing 
conceptions,”107 implying that these shortcomings should be perfected 
through other means.  Whether this sixth option of legal rhetoric is 
acceptable is discussed later in this Article.   But first, let us examine 
                                            
 105. See MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73. 
 106. Paul C. Yuan, The New Convention on the Law of the Sea from the Chinese 
Perspective, in CONSENSUS AND CONFRONTATION: THE UNITED STATES AND THE LAW OF 
THE SEA CONVENTION 185 (Jon M. Van Dyke ed., 1985) (citing PEOPLE’S DAILY, 
December 11, 1982, at 2); see also Gao, supra note 78, at 277 (“The head of the Chinese 
delegation pointed out at the final session that ‘there are quite a number of articles in the 
LOS Convention which are imperfect or even have serious drawbacks.’”). 
 107. See Ren Xiaofeng & Cheng Xizhong, A Chinese Perspective, 29 MARINE POL’Y 
139, 139 (2005).  Earlier, the author indicated that rhetoric would be derived from official 
statements and publications of China’s Government.  See supra note 24.  Throughout the 
remainder of this Article, the Ren and Cheng article will be assumed to be an official 
perspective of China’s Government for several valid reasons.  First, at the time of 
publication, both authors were members of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).  
Specifically, Dr. Ren was a Senior Captain in the PLA Navy, while Cheng was a Senior 
Colonel in the PLA.  Of note, Senior Captain Ren has served as the legal advisor to many 
Chinese delegations for many official international meetings regarding law of the sea 
matters.  Second, unlike some articles and publications by Chinese authors who are 
coincidentally employees of the Chinese Government, this 2005 article does not include a 
disclaimer that the authors are writing in only their personal capacities.  Third, during an 
international law conference hosted by U.S. Pacific Command several years ago, when a 
panel discussion on law of the sea matters included a presentation on the 2001 EP-3 
incident in the South China Sea, Chinese attendees at the conference distributed a copy of 
the Ren and Cheng article to the attendees as the one source of information representing 
the Chinese position.  
2012] A China in the Bull Shop? 221 
 
some of the specific rhetoric China has employed regarding the law of 
the sea since its accession to UNCLOS in 1996.   
IV.  SPECIFIC ISSUES OF CHINA’S RHETORIC ON  
LAW OF THE SEA MATTERS 
It would be easy to simply accuse China of not complying with 
international law or not accepting the existing international legal order.  
It might be more worthwhile, however, to consider whether what China 
says about the law of the sea matches up with the reality of what China 
believes, what other nations believe and do, and what the law of the sea 
actually means.  Accordingly, this Part compares what China says to the 
world with what it says internally to Chinese audiences; considers 
whether, as China alleges, the United States is singling China out for 
criticism on law of the sea matters; evaluates whether China’s words and 
actions on law of the sea matters are truly consistent with one another, 
especially regarding freedom of navigation; and analyzes whether China 
is sufficiently transparent on law of the sea matters and can be trusted on 
these matters.    
A.  The Real China Is Revealed “At Home” 
A disparity sometimes exists between rhetoric and reality in some 
types of relations, including personal relations such as marriage.  The 
author once heard a Navy chaplain tell a room full of married couples, 
“[w]e are who we are when we are at home.”108  What he meant was that 
while married couples often hold out a polished image of themselves to 
the public, the reality of the relationship is revealed through couples’ 
behavior and statements to one another inside the sanctuary of their own 
homes. 
Likewise, a similar disparity can exist between rhetoric and reality in 
international relations.  For China, a potential disparity exists between 
what China says to the world and what China really thinks about 
international law, including the law of the sea.  Although there is 
admittedly some value to examining the rhetorical words of China’s 
leaders spoken to the world to see what it thinks about international law, 
including the law of the sea, the true measure of reality is what China 
says within its national “household” on that same subject. An optimist 
would compare the PRC’s dismissive attitude towards “bourgeois 
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at CREDO Marriage Enrichment Retreat (Jan. 19, 2001). 
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international law” in the 1960s and 1970s to its more recent statements 
on the subject, like those made by Mr. Duan in 2006,109 and see progress.  
But, a realist would caution the world to not compare such positive 
words only with words spoken by a China that was closed off to the 
world in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s.  Instead, the world should compare 
China’s recent public statements to international audiences on matters of 
international law with what China has recently offered for consumption 
to its own internal audiences on that same subject. 
With respect to the statements China has made regarding 
international law within the comfort of its “home,” the world should 
consider what China’s military leaders have taught their rank and file 
officers.  For example, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) handbook 
on international law instructs PLA officers that, “[t]he Chinese 
government is . . . obliged to adhere strictly to all international laws . . . 
.”110  But three pages later, that same official publication admonishes its 
officers to “be flexible in the application of international laws.”111  It 
explains 
in practice, while we should adhere to the fundamental principles 
and relevant regulations contained in international laws, we 
should not feel completely bound by specific articles and 
stipulations detrimental to the defense of our national interests.  
We should therefore always apply international laws flexibly in 
the defense of our national interests and dignity, appealing to 
those aspects beneficial to our country while evading those 
detrimental to our interests.112 
Such internal direction for selective compliance of international law calls 
into question the sincerity of Director General Duan’s statements to the 
United Nations about strict adherence to international law.   
Statements by China’s national leadership to the legal experts within 
the Chinese Communist Party are also telling.  At a 1996 seminar on 
international law, then-President Jiang Zemin addressed his comrades in 
attendance in a manner consistent with the Chinese Communist’s long-
standing perspective of law as an instrument of state policy and 
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 110. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS 3 (Zhao Peiying ed., 1996) 
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international law as an instrument of foreign policy.113   Jiang Zemin 
urged, “[o]ur leaders and cadres, especially those of high rank, ought to 
take note of international law and enhance their skills in applying it . . . . 
We must be adept at using international law as ‘a weapon’ to defend the 
interests of our state and maintain national pride.”114  Although President 
Jiang’s words about “using international law as a weapon” might have 
been merely use of rhetoric,115  the PLA has since turned that rhetoric 
into a strategic reality.   
Since 2003, the PLA has been operationalizing a doctrinal concept it 
has named “Legal Warfare.”116  Consistent with former-President Jiang’s 
                                            
 113. COHEN & CHIU, supra note 7, at 32 (“During the anti-rightist campaign, for 
example, an article published in the authoritative People’s Daily, the newspaper of the 
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international problems.  If this instrument is useful to our country, to the socialist cause, 
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replace it’”); GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 6 (“Since the establishment of the People’s 
Republic emphasis has been given to Marxist-Leninist concept of law as an instrument of 
State policy, and international law as an instrument of foreign policy.”); Carr, supra note 
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there are so many law schools and law is separated from politics.  In China, however, 
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the two as inseparable.”). 
 114. WANG, supra note 98, at 128 (emphasis added).  See also Jiang Zemin Urges 
International Law Studies, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY (P.R.C.), Dec. 9, 1996 (“Chinese 
President and Communist Party of China (CPC) General Secretary Jiang Zemin today 
called on leading cadres, especially those at high levels, to study international law and 
improve their ability to use these rules.  Jiang urged cadres to utilize international law” in 
a variety of fields and emphasized the importance of employing international law  “to 
safeguard China’s national interests and dignity so that the country can take the initiative 
in international cooperation and competition, when presiding at a lecture on international 
law.”). 
 115. WANG, supra note 98, at 126.  
 116. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: MILITARY AND SECURITY 
DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 26 (2011), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS]. 
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call to use international law as a weapon, one of the PLA’s official 
textbooks, Under Informatized Conditions: Legal Warfare, defines 
“Legal Warfare” to include “activities conducted by using the law as the 
weapon and through measures and methods such as legal deterrence, 
legal attack, legal counterattack, legal restraint, legal sanctions, and legal 
protections.”117  The textbook further discusses “legal restraint” in terms 
of “shrink[ing] enemy’s political space” and “restrain[ing] and limit[ing] 
enemy’s combat operations”118—implying that China should use law to 
restrain the actions of others nations geospatially, as in the maritime and 
air domains.  In fact, the PLA textbook then expressly notes that Legal 
Warfare “involves” the “international laws of . . . the ocean.”119  
Additionally, the textbook specifically identifies domestic maritime laws, 
such as China’s “Laws of Territorial Waters and Their Adjacent Areas,” 
that also serve as the “armory of legal warfare.”120 
The stark contrast between China’s external rhetoric, that it is strictly 
bound by international law, and its internal guidance, that it must use 
“international law as a weapon”121 and that the PLA should not “feel 
completely bound by specific articles” of international law,122  reveals 
China’s true thoughts on international law.123  When the world witnesses 
China’s military leaders indoctrinating its military forces with notions 
that the international law of the ocean and China’s maritime and other 
domestic laws form the “armory of legal warfare,”124 the world begins to 
detect the reality of Chinese strategy in the law of the sea arena.  And 
what the world sees is a strategy designed to control and deny other 
nations’ lawful access to the waters of the Western Pacific. 
                                            
 117. UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS:  LEGAL WARFARE 7 (Song Yunxia ed., 2007) 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS] (emphasis added).  See also, Jin 
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 118. UNDER INFORMATIZED CONDITIONS, supra note 117, at 124. 
 119. Id. at 23. 
 120. Id. at 24. 
 121. WANG, supra note 98, at 128. 
 122. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS, supra note 104, at 6. 
 123. WANG, supra note 98, at 126. 
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B.  It’s Bigger Than China 
In the past two years, senior leaders of the U.S. Government have 
made a series of statements about the law of the sea in East Asia, 125 
some of which have been subjected to rhetorical criticism by senior 
leaders of the PRC Government.  For example, U.S. Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton delivered remarks at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum 
meeting that called for nations to respect international law and preserve 
freedom of navigation.126  In response, China’s Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, Yang Jiechi, issued a statement which characterized Clinton’s 
statements as “seemingly impartial remarks” that “were in effect an 
attack on China.”127  To the contrary, the U.S. interest in upholding the 
law of the sea is global and long-standing—and much bigger than China. 
In fact, the United States has upheld the law of the sea since the 
nation’s founding and consistently thereafter, including in oceans and 
seas distant from U.S. shores.  During the first half-century of U.S. 
history, there were “depredations” against U.S. commercial shipping in 
                                            
 125. See President Barack Obama, Press Conference with President Obama and 
President Hu of the People’s Republic of China (Jan. 19, 2011), available at 
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passage. . . . Our policy is clear: It is essential that stability, freedom of navigation, and 
free and unhindered economic development be maintained.  We do not take sides on any 
competing sovereignty claims, but we do oppose the use of force and actions that hinder 
freedom of navigation.”). 
 126. Clinton, Hanoi Remarks, supra note 125 (Secretary Clinton stated, “[t]he United 
States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to 
Asia’s maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.”). 
 127. Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi Refutes Fallacies on the South China Sea Issue, 
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the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean Sea, and adjoining seas.  In 
response, a series of early U.S. Presidents requested, the U.S. Congress 
authorized, and the U.S. Navy executed operations to protect the freedom 
of navigation guaranteed to these U.S. vessels under international law.128  
During the final phases of World War I, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson 
made his famous “Fourteen Points” speech129 to the U.S. Congress, 
during which he championed, as one of the universal principles for which 
the United States and others were fighting, “[a]bsolute freedom of 
navigation upon the seas, outside territorial waters, alike in peace and in 
war, except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international 
action for the enforcement of international covenants.”130  Three months 
before the United States entered World War II, President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt delivered his “Freedoms of the Seas” radio address to the 
American people, in which he declared, 
Generation after generation, America has battled for the general 
policy of the freedom of the seas.  And that policy is a very 
simple one, but a basic, a fundamental one.  It means that no 
nation has the right to make the broad oceans of the world at 
great distances from the actual theatre of land war, unsafe for the 
commerce of others.131 
Ultimately, Roosevelt concluded, “Upon our naval and air patrol -- now 
operating in large number over a vast expanse of the Atlantic Ocean -- 
falls the duty of maintaining the American policy of freedom of the 
seas.”132  All of these words and actions by the United States in defense 
of the law of the sea occurred many years ago—long before the PRC was 
established in 1949. 
For the past three decades, the U.S. Government has executed a 
multi-agency Freedom of Navigation (FON) program to uphold the law 
of the sea against excessive maritime claims by coastal states—not just 
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in the East Asia Sea, but throughout the world.  Composed of informal 
consultations, diplomatic protests, and operational assertions, the U.S. 
FON program is focused on the excessive nature of some maritime 
claims, rather than on the U.S. relationship with any particular coastal 
state.133   In other words, the United States challenges excessive claims 
asserted by close U.S. allies, by competitors, and by potential 
adversaries.134  For instance, in 1961—nearly two decades before the 
U.S. Government formally established its FON program—the United 
States diplomatically protested a maritime claim by treaty-ally Republic 
of Philippines as excessive under the law of the sea.135  Thus, despite the 
recent rhetoric of Chinese officials such as Foreign Minister Yang, China 
has not been singled out by the long-standing U.S. FON program. 
Additionally, the implication of China’s rhetoric that the United 
States has a newfound concern over the law of the sea, and in the South 
China Sea in particular, is also inconsistent with the reality of U.S. 
history.  To the contrary, the U.S. Government has repeatedly issued 
statements and taken actions over the past three decades to uphold the 
law of the sea in the South China Sea region.  Throughout the 1980s, 
1990s, and 2000s, the U.S. State Department has diplomatically 
protested, and the U.S. Navy has operationally challenged, excessive 
maritime claims asserted by South China Sea nations.136  In 1992, U.S. 
Undersecretary of State Robert Zoellick publicly stated that the U.S. 
Government’s position on the South China Sea remained unchanged, 
including that it “wanted freedom of navigation to be preserved. . . .”137  
In 1995, a U.S. State Department spokesman stated, “[m]aintaining 
freedom of navigation is a fundamental interest of the United States. 
Unhindered navigation by all ships and aircraft in the South China Sea is 
essential for the peace and prosperity of the entire Asia-Pacific region, 
including the United States.”138  All of these statements and actions 
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occurred long before July 2010.  Thus, it is clear that the United States 
did not first start caring about the law of the sea, including in the South 
China Sea, on the day that Secretary Clinton made her remarks two 
summers ago in Hanoi.  
C.  China Behaves Like It Wants to Hinder  
Freedom and Safety of Navigation 
PRC Foreign Minister Yang has factually disputed concerns that the 
law of the sea might be at risk in the South China Sea.  In response to 
Secretary Clinton’s remarks in July 2010, Foreign Minister Yang 
rhetorically asked, “has navigation freedom and safety been hindered in 
the South China Sea?”139  To which he quickly answered, “[o]bviously 
not.”140  As the official newspaper China Daily summarized Foreign 
Minister Yang’s point, “[t]he South China Sea is currently a peaceful 
area with navigational freedom.”141  Given the litany of state actions in 
the South China Sea, however, these statements by the PRC are woefully 
inaccurate.    
In reality, a majority of the coastal states bordering the South China 
Sea have taken actions evidencing an intent to hinder other nations’ 
lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the South China Sea.  Of the five 
nations bordering the South China Sea, Vietnam,142 Malaysia,143 the 
Philippines,144 and China145 assert maritime claims that are excessive 
under the law of the sea.  China, however, is the only one that has a “full 
house” of excessive claims.  That is, China has established one or more 
excessive claims for every maritime zone potentially available to a 
coastal state: it has improperly drawn straight baselines with excessive 
internal waters, restricted innocent passage in its territorial seas, asserted 
a security interest in its contiguous zone, and restricted non-economic 
activities in its exclusive economic zone.146  In fact, China is one of only 
seven nations in the entire world that has infamously adopted a “full 
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house” of excessive maritime claims.147  Therefore, the PRC Foreign 
Minister’s rhetoric that freedom of navigation is “obviously not 
hindered” in the South China Sea does not match the reality that his 
nation maintains one of the most comprehensive regimes of excessive 
maritime claims of any coastal state in the entire world. 
Through the years, the United States has diplomatically protested 
and operationally challenged all of these excessive maritime claims by 
South China Sea coastal states, including China.  Unfortunately, none of 
these coastal states have rescinded their excessive maritime claims, so 
the United States has no choice but to continue exercising its permissible 
rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas in order to preserve them under 
international law.  Thus, one of the primary reasons why China can even 
begin to rhetorically assert that freedom of navigation is “obviously not 
hindered” in the South China Sea area is precisely because the U.S. 
military forces have routinely operated in those waters and helped 
preserve those lawful rights, freedoms, and uses of the seas in that region 
for over one hundred fifty years.148  
In addition to enacting its comprehensive regime of excessive 
maritime claims, China attempts to hinder freedom of navigation by 
hindering safety of navigation.  Like most of the nations of the world, 
China is a party to the Convention on the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGS).149  COLREGS obligate 
member-nations to ensure their government and flagged vessels alike 
operate safely at sea through adherence to a detailed regime of specific 
safety rules.150  Nevertheless, in March of 2009, five PRC-flagged 
vessels unsafely surrounded USNS Impeccable in the South China Sea to 
the point that they would likely have caused a collision and endangered 
the lives of nationals from both nations, but for the heroic emergency all-
stop maneuver of the Impeccable’s master and crew.151  In doing so, at 
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least some of those five PRC vessels clearly violated the COLREGS.152  
Similarly, in the summer of 2011, another PRC-flagged fishing vessel 
clearly violated the COLREGS in the South China Sea when it cut the 
underwater equipment of a Vietnamese commercial survey vessel.153   
Given those COLREGS violations, rhetoric by PRC officials stating that 
“navigation safety” is not “hindered” in the South China Sea is 
inconsistent with the reports of repeated occurrences of unsafe conduct 
by PRC vessels, in addition to the corresponding inaction by the PRC 
Government to hold those PRC-flagged vessels to account. 
D.  China Expects Others to Do as China Says, but not as China Does 
For the past decade, China has made rhetorical statements 
characterizing activities conducted by foreign militaries beyond China’s 
territorial seas, including activities in and over China’s exclusive 
economic zone, as violations of the international law of the sea.  In April 
2001, after the collision between a U.S. Navy EP-3 plane and a PLA 
Navy F-8 fighter jet over China’s exclusive economic zone, a PRC 
spokesman stated that the EP-3’s military activities “violated” the law of 
the sea.154  In a 2005 article, the PLA Navy’s leading maritime lawyer 
argued that foreign military activities in a coastal state’s exclusive 
economic zone violated various rules and principles of the law of the 
sea.155  In March 2009, after five Chinese vessels harassed USNS 
Impeccable approximately seventy miles off the coast of China, a PRC 
spokesman stated, “[e]ngaging in activities in China’s exclusive 
economic zone in the South China Sea without China’s permission, US 
navy [sic] surveillance ship Impeccable broke relevant international law 
as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”156 Read together, these 
statements indicate that China asserts that foreign military activities in 
and over a coastal state’s exclusive economic zone violates the 
international law of the sea. 
                                            
 152. Id. 
 153. Vietnam Says Chinese Boat Harassed Survey Ship; China Disputes, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK, June 9, 2011, http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-06-09/vietnam-
says-chinese-boat-harassed-survey-ship-china-disputes.html; Vietnam Says China 
Fishing Boat Rams Research Ship, China Disputes, STRAITS TIMES, June 9, 2011, 
http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews/SEAsia/Story/STIStory_678024.html. 
 154. Chinese FM Spokesman Gives Full Account of Air Collision, XINHUA NEWS 
SERV., Apr. 4, 2001, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/20010404/393124A.htm. 
 155. See generally Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 139. 
 156. Ma, supra note 84. 
2012] A China in the Bull Shop? 231 
 
During that same period of time, however, China has conducted 
military activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations.  
Maritime legal scholars,157 and some of China’s neighbors,158 have 
catalogued through open sources a series of PRC state actions in recent 
years where China’s military forces have repeatedly operated in waters 
off the coast of third-party nations like Japan and the Philippines.  These 
waters are the equivalent of those off the Chinese coast where the PRC 
has attempted to restrict the military activities of the United States and 
other nations.  While the United States has demonstrated a consistent 
position of word and deed on these law of the sea issues, 159 the rhetoric 
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United States.  In the summer of 2009, there were reports in the Washington Post that 
Russian submarines were operating off the coast of the United States.  Philip P. Pan, Russian 
General Calls Submarine Patrols Near U.S. East Coast Routine, Wash. Post, Aug. 6, 2009, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/08/04/AR2009080402863.html. In response to these Russian 
submarine operations, a U.S. Department of Defense spokesman said, “Did we have an 
indication that they were coming this way?  Sure. . . . The larger question is, is it of concern 
to us.  And the answer to that is -- no.”   Id.  More recently, in the summer of 2010, the 
Washington Times reported that Russian bombers were conducting air operations over U.S. 
airspace.  Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring, WASH. TIMES, July 7, 2010, 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/jul/7/inside-the-ring-404830028/.  In response 
to those Russian bomber operations, the head of U.S. Northern Command told the media, 
“we intercept them when we feel like we ought to, and we have various criteria that we use 
for that, to include just rehearsing our own skills to be able to do that.  [However, in general] 
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of China—that foreign militaries lack the legal right to operate within 
China’s exclusive economic zone—is undermined by similar Chinese 
military activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations.  
Apparently, China expects the world to do as China says, and not as 
China does. 
E.  It’s a Matter of Transparency and Maturity 
“Legal transparency” is a critical principle of the rule of law, both 
domestically and internationally.160  In the international law context, 
legal transparency means that the legal position of a nation on a 
particular issue is identified and justified; thereafter, other nations in the 
consent-based international legal order can consider that position and its 
purported justification, scrutinize it, and choose to consent or object to 
that position.161  Transparency is also related to maturity.  In 
international relations, diplomatic or political dialogues between nations 
have been characterized as mature and immature, with mature political 
dialogues being those in which the parties move beyond rehashed talking 
                                                                                                  
we just leave them alone.”  Id.  In both situations, there is no evidence to indicate that the 
United States diplomatically objected to these lawful military activities, or that U.S. forces 
reacted unsafely or unprofessionally.  This demonstrates an alternative reality: that of a nation 
that honestly believes in its legal position on matters involving the law of the sea, and does 
not challenge the right of other nations to exercise those same navigational freedoms in its 
maritime zones. 
 160. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary General on the Rule of Law and 
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 
(Aug. 23, 2004), available at http://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/ 
Get?Open&DS=S/2004/616&Lang=E&Area=UNDOC (“The rule of law is a concept at 
the very heart of the Organization’s mission.  It refers to a principle of governance in 
which all persons, institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, 
are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards.  It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the principles 
of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in the 
application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal 
certainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 161. Because international law is a consent-based regime, nations cannot provide 
informed consent to the official actions of other nations if those actions and the legal 
justification for those actions are not transparent.  In fact, that sequential process is what 
underlies the long-accepted concept of customary international law known as the 
“persistent objector.”  IAN BROWNLEE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 11 
(6th ed. 2003). 
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points.162  Similarly, in the international law context, legal dialogues 
between nations can also be characterized as mature and immature: 
mature legal dialogues are those in which all parties clearly identify their 
respective legal positions, justify those legal positions based upon sound 
legal methodology (e.g., ordinary meaning, context, negotiating history 
of conventions, and respect for custom), concede points of convergence, 
recognize points of divergence, and attempt to refute those points of 
divergence through sound legal methodology.163  Ultimately, only 
through mutual legal transparency can nations attain mature legal 
dialogues in their relations with other nations.  In other words, if one 
nation is transparent in its legal positions and justifications, but another 
nation chooses not to be equally transparent and instead continues to rely 
upon superficial rhetoric, then a mature legal dialogue between those 
nations becomes extremely difficult, if not impossible. 
In recent years, nations such as the United States,164 Australia,165 
Japan,166  and Vietnam167 have expressed concern over China’s lack of 
                                            
 162. See, e.g., Kathrin Hille, US Warns Over Beijing’s “Assertiveness,” FIN. TIMES, 
May 25, 2010, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0a97c53a-681a-11df-a52f-
00144feab49a.html#axzz1jVctPVgG (quoting Admiral Robert Willard as saying, “What 
was very striking yesterday was my impression of the very advanced, sophisticated and 
mature dialogue that’s occurring across a wide range of subjects [at the Strategic and 
Economic Dialogue] between China and the US. . . . That is in contrast with a very 
immature military-to-military relationship.”) (emphasis added); see also Yoichi Kato, 
U.S. Commander Says China Aims to Be a “Global Military” Power, ASAHI SHIMBUN, 
Dec. 28, 2010, http://luckybogey.wordpress.com/category/travel/page/category/ 
aviation/page/3 (quoting Admiral Robert F. Willard, Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 
as saying, “There is an effort on the part of the United States to engage China. I think 
there is an effort on the part of China to engage the United States. And I think that it’s 
very broad.  At the Strategic and Economic Dialogue that I attended with Secretary 
Clinton, I was struck by the very rich and mature engagement across many of our 
secretariats and many of China’s ministries and the depth of commitment that they both 
had to their dialogue. On the military side, we’re relatively immature and behind in our 
relationship, and I think it affects the perception of that strategic relationship between the 
two nations.”) (emphasis added).  
 163. To illustrate the difference between mature and immature legal perspectives, 
consider an analogy to statutory interpretation. To a non-lawyer, a rule means what it 
says on its face, and nothing more. This is an immature perspective. In contrast, a 
seasoned lawyer can extract a deeper understanding of the meanings from that same 
statute, from its text, its context, its legislative history, and related case law.  This is a 
mature perspective. 
 164. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 116, at I 
(stating that many uncertainties remain regarding how China will use its expanding 
military capabilities, and that China’s limited transparency in its military and security 
affairs enhances uncertainty and increases the potential for misunderstanding and 
miscalculation.); see also China: Military And Security Developments: Hearing Before 
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“transparency” in matters involving international affairs.  Similarly, on 
law of the sea matters, China has also demonstrated a lack of 
transparency.  For example, after the Impeccable incident in March 2009, 
a PRC spokesman made a declarative statement that the U.S. Navy’s 
activities “broke international law,” but deliberately refused to provide 
news reporters with a transparent explanation of how foreign military 
activities in China’s exclusive economic zone violated international 
law.168  Similarly, China unilaterally draws a nine-dash line on its South 
                                                                                                  
the H. Comm. on Armed Services 111th Cong. 59 (2010) (statement of  Wallace C. 
Gregson, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Asian and Pacific Security Affairs), 
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=111_house_hearings&docid=f:58169.pdf (stating that the United 
States “remain[s] concerned over the relative lack of transparency from China into the 
military capabilities it is acquiring, the intentions that motivate those acquisitions, and the 
resources dedicated to the task”); Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary of State, Inaugural 
Richard C. Holbrooke Lecture: A Broad Vision of U.S.-China Relations in the 21st 
Century (Jan. 14, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2011/01/ 
154653.htm (“The United States and the international community have watched China’s 
efforts to modernize and expand its military, and we have sought clarity as to its 
intentions.  As Secretary Gates stressed in Beijing this week, both sides would benefit 
from sustained and substantive military-to-military engagement that increases 
transparency.  We need more high-level visits, more joint exercises, more exchanges 
from our professional military organizations, and other steps to build that trust, 
understanding of intentions, and familiarity.”). 
 165. DEP’T OF DEF. (AUSTL.), DEFENDING AUSTRALIA IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC CENTURY:  
FORCE 2030, 95 (2009), available at http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/ 
defence_white_paper_2009.pdf (emphasizing the need for greater military-to-military 
engagement with China in order to “encourage transparency about Chinese military 
capabilities and intentions.”).   
 166. MINISTRY OF DEF. (JAPAN), DEFENSE OF JAPAN 2010, 55 (2010), available at 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2010/11Part1_Chapter2_Sec3.pdf (“China has 
not yet achieved the levels of transparency expected of a responsible major power in the 
international society.”).   
 167. Greg Terode, A Flash of Steel and Velvet Glove From Vietnam, SOUTH CHINA 
MORNING POST, July 29, 2010, http://viet-studies.info/kinhte/NguyenChiVinh%20_steel_ 
and_velvet.htm (Quoting Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, Deputy Defence 
Minister of  Vietnam as saying, “No confidence-building measure [by the Chinese 
military] could be better than transparency.”). 
 168. Ma, supra note 84 (“Engaging in activities in China’s exclusive economic zone in 
the South China Sea without China’s permission, US navy surveillance ship Impeccable 
broke relevant international law as well as Chinese laws and regulations.”). The reporters 
present at the March 10th press conference immediately realized that this official 
statement by Mr. Ma was purely conclusory in nature.  Id.  Thus, a follow-up question 
was asked by a reporter that requested specificity:  
[Reporter]: Can you clearly explain which article of the international law that the 
US ship broke and which specific act of the US ship broke the international law?    
2012] A China in the Bull Shop? 235 
 
China Sea maps and declares “indisputable sovereignty”169 in the area, 
but refuses to officially clarify to other nations what those nine dashes 
specifically mean or how international law justifies them.  Consequently, 
nations such as the United States,170 Indonesia,171 and Singapore172 have 
called upon China to be transparent and clarify its claim in the South 
China Sea. 
                                                                                                  
[Mr. Ma]: It seems that you are very interested in this issue.  I think China’s 
position is already very clear, and I responded to the US stories.  I can also tell you 
that China handles such issues in accordance with relevant laws and regulations.  I 
have nothing more to add.   
Id.  Mr. Ma’s non-discussion of the law avoided specificity at the outset, and when 
questioned thereafter, he referred back to the previous statements of non-specificity.  Id.  
The reporters present were still not satisfied with this superficial response on the law, as 
indicated by a second follow-up question, again requesting specificity:  
[Reporter]: I want to go back to the question of the US surveillance ship.  You did 
mention a number of laws.  Could you clarify what specific parts of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea and Chinese laws of the sea are concerned so 
that we can refer to it and see on paper to know what you are talking about?  
 
[Mr. Ma]：While answering the questions, I mentioned three laws: UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, Law of the People’s Republic of China on the 
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, and Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Management of Foreign-related Marine 
Scientific Research.  I suggest you go back to do some homework, reading these 
laws carefully, and you will thereby find the answer you want. 
Id.  Here again, Mr. Ma implied that the rules of law in UNCLOS are so clear on their 
face that the reporters should be able to see that China is correct, merely by reading the 
Convention’s text.  Through all of these statements, however, China never specified 
which provision of international law restricted the Impeccable’s right to operate in these 
waters beyond China’s territorial seas.  Id.  Moreover, China failed to specify which rule 
of international law gave it the authority to require the Impeccable to seek and receive 
China’s permission prior to conducting operations beyond its territorial seas.  Id. 
 169. Letter from Permanent Mission to the United Nations (Indon.) to Ban Ki-moon, 
Secretary General, United Nations (July 8, 2010), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/clcs_new/ 
submissions_files/mysvnm33_09/idn_2010re_mys_vnm_e.pdf [hereinafter Letter from 
Permanent Mission]. 
 170. See Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia:  Hearing Before the 
S. Subcomm. on E. Asian and Pac. Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Scot 
Marciel, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs), available 
at http://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/MarcielTestimony090715p1.pdf. 
 171. See Letter from Permanent Mission, supra note 169. 
 172. Comments in Responses to Media Queries, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 
SINGAPORE (June 20, 2011), http://app.mfa.gov.sg/2006/press/ 
view_press.asp?post_id=7070. 
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Unfortunately, China has not explained its lack of transparency on 
these law of the sea matters.  China might still be learning how to fit into 
the existing international legal order after opting out of it for many 
years.173  Alternatively or additionally, China might be afraid of 
revealing or conceding the weakness of its legal positions.174 Regardless 
of China’s reasons, it is impossible for nations to engage China in mature 
legal dialogue when it refuses to reciprocate the transparency of legal 
positions and justifications provided by nations like the United States on 
law of the sea matters.175  Yet transparency and mature dialogue by all 
                                            
 173. In the fall of 2010, the late Professor Jon Van Dyke of the University of Hawaii’s 
William S. Richardson School of Law hosted a South China Sea workshop that included 
a group of Chinese legal scholars and which this author attended.  During an informal 
lunch at the workshop, the author asked one of the Chinese scholars—who was a 
“visiting scholar” from China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs—why Chinese scholars 
repeatedly state that the nine-dash line could have one of several meanings, but China’s 
Government continues to refrain from stating the true meaning of the line.  After a little 
back and forth discussion, he finally asked, “What do you think would be a reasonable 
meaning of the line?”  The author’s response:  “That’s not how international law works.  
Rather, your government has to explain the line, justify it under the established 
international law regime, and then other nations in the world will consider that 
explanation and justification, and take a position on it.”  In reality, that is the way the 
international legal order has functioned for many years, and that is the way the world 
should insist it continue to function—in the interest of stability and transparency in 
international rule of law. 
 174. The question should be asked:  Why does China’s Government refuse to be more 
transparent on stating the meaning of and providing legal justification for state actions, 
such as drawing its nine-dashed line in the South China Sea?  To answer this question, 
we should consider a common refrain of China’s reluctance to be more transparent about 
its military in general as a possible mindset for their reticence to be more transparent in 
international law matters.  See, e.g., Lu Yin, Relativity of Military Transparency, CHINA 
DAILY (P.R.C.), Oct. 29, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-
10/29/content_8865633.htm (“[T]ransparency has also become an instrument of the 
strong to exert pressure on the weak.  Obviously, transparency is in favor of the strong, as 
deterrence.  For the weak, transparency means revealing weaknesses and becoming more 
vulnerable.”)  In the context of legal transparency, perhaps China is concerned that if it 
tries to provide a detailed explanation and justification for such tenuous legal positions 
like its purported restriction of its exclusive economic zone or its nine-dash line claim, 
such transparency will “reveal weakness” and its rhetorical house of cards will quickly 
collapse. 
 175. The United States supports transparency about matters involving international 
law, including the law of the sea.  See, e.g., Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal, supra note 
67; MARITIME CLAIMS REFERENCE MANUAL, supra note 73; U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, 
ANNUAL REPORTS OF FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION OPERATIONAL ASSERTIONS: FISCAL YEARS 
2000-2010, available at http://policy.defense.gov/gsa/cwmd/fon.aspx; U.S. DEP’T. OF 
NAVY ET AL., NWP 1-14 M, COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL 
OPERATIONS (2007), available at http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/a9b8e92d-2c8d-
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nations is essential to the functioning of the existing international legal 
order.  Therefore, the world should insist that China demonstrate genuine 
support for the established international legal order, by improving its 
transparency and openness on law of the sea matters. 
F.  It’s Also a Matter of Trust 
Candor is also a fundamental prerequisite of any mature legal 
dialogue.  For example, consider what the ethical rules and codes of 
professional conduct require from practicing attorneys.  Lawyers shall 
never make false or incorrect statements of fact or law to a judge or 
tribunal.176  Lawyers shall never make false or incorrect statements of 
fact or law to a third party.177  They shall never induce or assist their 
                                                                                                  
4779-9925-0defea93325c/1-14M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP.pdf [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF 
NAVY ET AL., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK]. 
 176. For the rule of professional conduct of U.S. attorneys that requires candor to a 
tribunal, see, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/rule_3_3.html (“A lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make 
a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material 
fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer.”).  For rules of professional 
conduct for attorneys appearing before international tribunals, see, e.g., CODE OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL, INT’L CRIM. CT. art. 24(3), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ BD397ECF-8CA8-44EF-92C6-
AB4BEBD55BE2/140121/ICCASP432Res1_English.pdf (“Counsel shall not deceive or 
knowingly mislead the Court. He or she shall take all steps necessary to correct an 
erroneous statement made by him or her or by assistants or staff as soon as possible after 
becoming aware that the statement was erroneous.”); id. art. 25(1) (“Counsel shall at all 
times maintain the integrity of evidence, whether in written, oral or any other form, 
which is submitted to the Court. He or she shall not introduce evidence which he or she 
knows to be incorrect.”).  See also CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT FOR COUNSEL APPEARING 
BEFORE THE INT’L TRIBUNAL, INT’L CRIM. TRIBUNAL FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, art. 
23(B), available at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/ 
Defence/defence_code_of_conduct_june2006.pdf; id.  art. 23(2) (“Counsel shall not 
knowingly: (i) make an incorrect statement of material fact or law to the Tribunal; or (ii) 
offer evidence which counsel knows to be incorrect.”); id. art. 23(D) (“Counsel shall take 
all necessary steps to correct an incorrect statement of material fact or law by counsel in 
proceedings before the Tribunal as soon as possible after counsel becomes aware that the 
statement was incorrect.”). Interestingly, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
has not adopted a code or rules of professional conduct for attorneys appearing before the 
Tribunal.  See Laurel S. Terry, Codes of Conduct for International Tribunals and 
Arbitration (May 11, 2009), available at http://www.personal.psu.edu/faculty/l/s/lst3/ 
presentations%20for%20webpage/ASIL_Terry_Codes_International_Tribunals.pdf. 
 177. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.1, available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules
_of_professional_conduct/rule_4_1_truthfulness_in_statements_to_others (“In the course 
of representing a client a lawyer shall not knowingly: (a) make a false statement of 
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client or witnesses to make false statements.178  They shall never falsify 
evidence.179  More generally, they shall not “engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”180  Therefore, 
as critical as transparency might be in fostering a mature legal dialogue, 
honesty and truthfulness on matters of fact and law are equally 
important181 to ensure that a legal dialogue is mature.  Candor, honesty 
and truthfulness by the attorneys and other representatives of parties will 
foster trust between the parties; likewise, deception and misleading 
statements of fact and law by representatives can perpetuate mistrust 
between nations. 
In recent years, the United States182 and China’s neighbors183 have 
expressed concerns about trusting China on matters of international 
affairs as well as law of the sea matters.  While some in China allege that 
the United States and other nations attempt to plant “seeds of distrust,”184 
                                                                                                  
material fact or law to a third person; or (b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third 
person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a 
client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.”). 
 178. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify 
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness 
that is prohibited by law.”). 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. at 8.4(c) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct 
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”). 
 181. At the outset of their legal education, practicing lawyers learn that deceiving the 
judge about the facts or the law of the case at hand is a cardinal sin—it destroys your 
credibility before the tribunal and will not be easily forgotten.  See JAMES W. 
MCELHANEY, MCELHANEY’S LITIGATION 12 (1995) (“Nothing devastates your credibility 
more than looking like you deliberately created a false impression.”). 
 182. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON MILITARY 
AND SECURITY DEVELOPMENTS INVOLVING THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA I (2010), 
http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/070523-china-military-power-final.pdf (“Sustained 
and reliable U.S.-China military-to-military relations support this goal by reducing 
mistrust, enhancing mutual understanding and broadening cooperation.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 183. Asia’s Mistrust of China:  Fear of Beijing is Based On Its Past Behavior and 
Strategic Culture, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10001424053111903461104576459660040607374.html. 
 184. These “seeds of distrust” appear to be a common refrain when Beijing wishes to 
cast blame on the United States for any problems of trust arising in international relations 
with China.  See, e.g., Strategic Trust Needed, CHINA DAILY , Jan. 11, 2011, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/11/content_11823273.htm (“The US 
arms sales to Taiwan, which have been ongoing for more than 30 years, are the biggest 
impediment, but intensive reconnaissance and surveillance of the Chinese mainland from 
the South China Sea and East China Sea and Washington’s growing penchant for 
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the reality is that China’s own actions provide “fertile ground” for other 
nations to mistrust China.185  The rhetoric employed by the PRC 
Government in ongoing law of the sea disputes provides ample cause for 
mistrust; it has been deficient on both statements of fact and statements 
of law. 
Some of the PRC’s statements of material facts pertaining to 
incidents involving the law of the seas have been inaccurate.   For 
example, after the Impeccable incident of March 2009, a PRC 
spokesmen characterized the U.S. factual account of the incident as 
“flatly inaccurate,” “gravely in contravention of the facts,” “groundless 
accusations,” and ultimately “sheer lies.”186  These rhetorical 
characterizations, however, were soon refuted by a series of 
photographs187 and video clips188 taken during the incident that 
corroborated the U.S. account.  Similarly, after the December 2010 
                                                                                                  
projecting its military power in the Asia Pacific have also sowed the seeds of distrust 
between the two militaries.”). 
 185. They Have Returned:  China Should Worry Less About America’s “Containment” 
Strategy and More About Why the Neighbours Welcome It, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 12, 
2010, http://www.economist.com/node/16791842. 
 186. Ma, supra note 84; China Lodges Representation as U.S. Naval Ship Breaks Int’l, 
Chinese Laws, XINHUA GENERAL NEWS SERV., Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/11/content_10990180.htm;  Defense Ministry 
Urges U.S. to Respect China’s Security Concern, XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, Mar. 11, 2009, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/11/content_10994295.htm; Regular Press 
Release, Spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs Qin Gang (Mar. 25, 2009), available 
at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/2511/t553628.htm.  
 187. Chinese Vessels Shadow, Harass Unarmed U.S. Surveillance Ship, NAVY.MIL, 
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.navy.mil/ view_single.asp?id=69478 (photo depicting the 
Chinese vessels accompanying article).  
 188. Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW, YOUTUBE (Mar. 
8, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G59796asqIs (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 2, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F8nZjDrj4qY (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 3, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dn4mPttljEY (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 4, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aBBwr6EQAYc (last visited Mar. 26, 2010); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 5, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9SyTz4q2r5k; Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships 
Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 6, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 2009), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6e55hrHZLm8 (last visited Apr. 18, 2012); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 7, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ye-BEI5_QC8 (last visited Apr. 18,2012); 
Periodicvideo, Chinese Ships Approach USNS Impeccable RAW # 8, YOUTUBE (Mar. 8, 
2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7D-Kfza58s (last visited Apr. 18, 2012). 
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collision between a PRC-flagged fishing vessel and a ROK Coast Guard 
vessel, a PRC spokesman called upon the ROK to “punish [ROK Coast 
Guard] perpetrators to the full extent of law,” “make compensation for 
the loss of our crew and property,”189 and “take concrete measures to 
prevent reoccurrences of such incidents.”190  Here again, this PRC 
rhetoric regarding the ROK’s alleged culpability was refuted when the 
Chinese fishermen confessed191 to intentionally colliding with the ROK 
Coast Guard vessel and the ROK released video evidence of the incident 
that “showed a brawl in which iron pipes were used as weapons by 
fishermen.”192  In both situations, the rhetoric employed by China after 
these incidents was subsequently undermined by evidence of what really 
happened.  
Additionally, China has also made misleading statements of law on 
these matters.  In legal arguments, lawyers must disclose legal authorities 
that are “directly adverse” to their client’s case.193  On matters of 
international law like the law of the sea, this includes not using the words 
and phrases within treaties and conventions out of context.194  Contrary 
to that expectation, China’s standard approach to the law is to 
“assembl[e] . . . legal clauses to frame . . . political arguments and . . . 
                                            
 189. China Demands Compensation over Collision in Yellow Sea, KYODO NEWS 
INTERNAT’L, Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9K87Q380& 
show_article=1. 
 190. Regular Press Conference, Ministry of Foreign Affars Spokesman (Dec. 22, 
2010), available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t780909.htm.   
 191. S. Korea Releases 3 Chinese Fishermen Without Indictment, KYODO NEWS INT’L, 
Dec. 27, 2010, http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D9KAMQE81&show_article=1 
(“During questioning by the South Korean Coast Guard, the three Chinese fisherman 
admitted that their ship intentionally collided with the patrol boat to prevent it from 
tracking another Chinese fishing vessel.”). 
 192. S. Korea Releases Chinese Fishermen, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 25, 2010, http://www.upi. 
com/Top_News/World-News/2010/12/25/S-Korea-releases-Chinese-fishermen/UPI-57581293286
587/. 
 193. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. 4 (2010) noting that:  
A lawyer is not required to make a disinterested exposition of the law, but must 
recognize the existence of pertinent legal authorities. Furthermore…an advocate 
has a duty to disclose directly adverse authority in the controlling jurisdiction that 
has not been disclosed by the opposing party. The underlying concept is that legal 
argument is a discussion seeking to determine the legal premises properly 
applicable to the case. 
 194. Vienna Convention, supra note 26, at art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be interpreted in 
good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty 
in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”) (emphasis added). 
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propaganda campaign[s].”195  For example, China argues to the world 
that foreign military activities in its exclusive economic zone violate 
UNCLOS because they are not, in China’s view, a “peaceful use” of the 
ocean or intended for a “peaceful purpose.”196  This stance, however, 
takes these two phrases out of their appropriate context within 
UNCLOS,197 as those phrases also apply to the high seas, and the 
negotiators of UNCLOS clearly had no intent of demilitarizing the 
oceans of the world.198  Additionally, China has argued that foreign 
military activities in its exclusive economic zone are illegal because they 
threaten the coastal state’s environment.199  This position, however, 
                                            
 195. See, e.g., JAMES MCGREGOR, ONE BILLION CUSTOMERS: LESSONS FROM THE FRONT 
LINES OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 150-151 (2005) (McGregor recounts his negotiations 
with China’s official news service Xinhua and the Chinese Government for access to 
reporting financial news in China.  McGregor identified a classic Chinese bargaining 
technique:   
We also used the law as a political weapon, just as the Communist Party does.  We 
searched through international and domestic statutes and trade pacts to find 
language we could turn into noble weapons that put us on the side of the angels . . . 
. [W]e weren’t building a legal case.  We didn’t have a clear one.  Instead, we used 
this assemblage of legal clauses to frame our political arguments and our 
propaganda campaign. 
 196. See Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 142-144. 
 197. UNCLOS, supra note 25, at arts. 88, 301.  The reference to “peaceful uses” in 
Article 301, however, is not within the text of the article, but rather the title of the article 
itself. 
 198. Bernard Oxman, The Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention 
on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J.  INT’L L. 809, 831-832 (1984)  
If there is anything that is clear from the legislative record of the Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, it is that one of the primary motivations of the major maritime 
powers in negotiating a new Convention was to protect the broadest possible 
freedom to conduct military activities at sea.  It is unlikely that they would have 
agreed to legal restraints on those very activities without significant negotiation 
and detail. 
 See also George V. Galdorisi & Alan G. Kauffman, Military Activities in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CAL. W. INT’L L.J. 
253, 294 n.238.   
[T]he Chinese analysis is “based on a flawed understanding of the meaning of 
article 301 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea by which the 
writer inflates the meaning of article 58 to include security concerns. . . . Taken to 
its logical conclusion, the argument would exclude the operation of warships and 
military aircraft everywhere, even on the high seas.” 
Id. (quoting Ivan Shearer, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic Zone: The Case 
of Aerial Surveillance, 17 OCEAN Y.B. 548, 560-61 (2003)) 
 199. See Ren & Cheng, supra note 107, at 140; see also Zuoping, supra note 87, at 2 
noting that UNCLOS 
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ignores the “directly adverse” provision of UNCLOS that expressly 
exempts sovereign immune vessels, including warships, from 
compliance with coastal states’ environmental regulations that govern 
their exclusive economic zones.200  
V.  RHETORIC AS A CAUSE FOR CONCERN 
Rhetoric is “the art of speaking or writing effectively.”201  
Effectiveness is not synonymous with accuracy or truthfulness.  Rather, 
words or actions are effective if they produce a desired or intended 
effect.  Therefore, in assessing whether China’s use of rhetoric is 
effective, we must consider the desired or intended effect of its rhetoric.  
At its core, the purpose of China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters is 
the same as that behind China’s employment of “legal warfare” in the 
law of the sea—using domestic and international law to restrain the 
activities of other nations by shrinking their political and physical 
space.202  
Should China’s use of such rhetoric worry other nations?  Perhaps it 
is true that a nation’s use of words has no tangible effect and that only 
actions pose a risk to international security and stability, but should the 
world dismiss China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters as “just words” 
that pose no risk to the community of nations?   
By its nature, laws—be they domestic or international, conventional 
or customary—are composed of words.  Anyone who assumes that rules 
of law are “just words” need only consider the actions that domestic 
statutes and international conventions authorize or limit, as well as the 
consequences for violating laws such as criminal statutes.  Likewise, 
statements of law and interpretations of law must be accurate and 
grounded in accepted legal methodology.  For example, conventions 
                                                                                                  
indeed stipulates that countries have navigation rights in other countries’ EEZs.  
But the convention also states that a coastal country has sole ownership of the 
biological and non-biological resources inside its EEZs, as well as sovereign rights 
of exploitation, exploration, maintenance and management.  A coastal country can 
also enact its own laws to prevent, control and reduce pollution.  These navigation 
rights refer to ‘innocent passage,’ on which point the U.S. Navy obviously cannot 
stand.  Therefore, it is necessary and perfectly justifiable for China to dispel U.S. 
Navy surveillance ships from its EEZs to protect its marine environment and 
resources. 
 200. UNCLOS, supra note 25, at art. 236.  See also Oxman, supra note 198, at 820.  
 201. Rhetoric Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/rhetoric (last visited Apr. 18, 2012). 
 202. See supra Part III.A.  
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such as UNCLOS must be read with the aid of established rules of 
interpretation, such as respecting the ordinary meaning, the context, and 
the drafters’ intent of the words contained in those rules of law.  
Additionally, the rules of customary law should be respected as much as 
those of conventional law, even if a particular nation did not participate 
during the period when the law developed.  If a particular nation 
manipulates the rules of a convention or ignores the long-standing 
customs and practices of nations, that is not simply a harmless matter of 
“just words.”  Instead, such “verbal acts”203 of official statements and 
interpretations of international law are forms of state action that are 
intended to have a negative effect on an international legal regime and 
the existing international order. 
When the realities of the law of the sea are compared to China’s 
rhetoric, it appears that modern China behaves as if the world is stuck in 
an international version of “Groundhog Day,”204 where nations are 
unaware of yesterday or tomorrow in the international legal order and 
where the actions of one nation (i.e., China) have no long-term 
consequences.  PRC rhetoric undervalues the significance of centuries of 
state practice, disregards the history of treaty negotiations under 
UNCLOS, and ignores the fact that China voluntarily acceded to the 
treaty with few written declarations, none of which interpreted the 
exclusive economic zone concept in the manner China seeks to now.  It 
is not realistic for China to operate as if the nations of the world live only 
in the here and now, where the law stands still in deference to a rising 
China.    
On the contrary, the other nations of the world know that the existing 
international legal order and system, including the law of the sea, does 
not function in that way.  In terms of conventional law, a convention that 
was deliberately negotiated and concluded by more than one hundred 
nations three decades ago still matter.  In terms of customary 
international law, the practices of states over a period of decades—and 
even centuries—still matter.  Actions, as well as inactions, by nation-
states have consequences.  PRC’s deliberate decision to largely isolate 
itself for the first several decades of its existence, while the body of 
international law continued to develop, is now resulting in conflict 
between the realities of current international law and PRC’s interests.  
                                            
 203. The concept of “verbal acts” is manifested in various subspecialties of law (e.g., 
contract law, rules of evidence), and focuses on how some verbal statements should be 
construed as actions. 
 204. For a synopsis of the movie, see Plot Summary for Groundhog Day, IMDB.COM, 
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0107048/plotsummary (last visited Mar. 21, 2012).  
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Plain and simple, international law was not born when the PRC started to 
care about it.  
As discussed, China’s rhetoric does not fully match up with the 
reality of international law.  Moreover, there is not merely one 
disconnect between over what the international law of the sea says versus 
what China wishes it said.  Rather, there are many disconnects.  For this 
reason, the only reasonable answer to the Mederios question whether 
China accepts or seeks to rewrite the prevailing rules of the law of the 
sea is: China does not accept the prevailing rules of the international law 
of the sea, instead China seeks to rewrite them. 
The effect of that conclusion should be concerning to the world.  
China’s efforts jeopardize the entire UNCLOS regime, which took nearly 
a decade to negotiate and has been ratified by 162 of the 192 nations of 
the world.205  The legal regime reflected in UNCLOS was a grand 
bargain between all of the states, the United States and China among 
them, who had a seat at the bargaining table during those ten plus years 
of peaceful and deliberate negotiations.  Like any bargain, no nation at 
the UNCLOS negotiations received everything it wanted.  At the final 
session in Montego Bay in December 1982, Ambassador Tommy Koh 
from Singapore identified several common observations shared among 
the negotiators that highlight the nature of the bargained deal.  One 
observation was that no individual nation was “fully satisfied” with the 
UNCLOS bargain as it was structured to accommodate competing 
interests.206  Another observation was that UNCLOS was a “package” 
deal where nations were not allowed to selectively follow certain 
provisions and disregard others.207  In short, no compromise is perfect.  
But, as pointed out by Ambassador Koh, these compromises are the 
strengths, not weaknesses, of the Convention.208 
Many of the points about the law of the sea that China seeks to raise 
now were addressed at previous negotiating conferences where China 
had an opportunity to press its views.  However, the majority view 
prevailed and China’s position on many of these issues was rejected.209  
Thus, if China is permitted to ignore the realities of the international law 
                                            
 205. For a list of the 162 nations that have acceded to UNCLOS, see U.N. Div. for 
Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea, supra note 87.  
 206. See generally Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh, President, Third U.N. Conference 
on the Law of the Sea, A Constitution for the Oceans (Dec. 1982), available at 
http://www.un.org/depts/los/ convention_agreements/texts/koh_english.pdf. 
 207. Id.   
 208. Id. at xxxvii. 
 209. See, e.g., Oxman supra note 198, at 831-832 (discussing the freedom of military 
navigation). 
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of the sea—including the ordinary meaning, context, and intent of these 
UNCLOS’s rules—then nothing prevents other nations from emulating 
China’s rhetorical approach of selective compliance in the name of 
imperfections, drawbacks, or shortcomings,210 potentially undermining 
almost ten years of extensive multilateral negotiations and possibly 
jeopardizing the UNCLOS regime.   Such noble-sounding rhetoric 
ignores the reality that no treaty or convention can ever be perfected.  
The only way a treaty can be perfected is when one nation receives 
everything it wants and then it is only perfect for that nation–which 
sounds a lot like the “unequal treaties” of the nineteenth century which 
the China has scorned for nearly a century.  
VI.  WAYS CHINA CAN REASSURE THE WORLD 
Actions and inaction by nation-states do have consequences. 
Accordingly, the reader might ask:  What specifically could China do, or 
abstain from doing, to yield a positive result in its relations with other 
nations in regard to the law of the sea?  Several suggestions follow. 
First, China’s Government could make better efforts to publish its 
official legal interpretations and manuals on international law, including 
those focused on the law of the sea.  By comparison, the U.S. 
Government has been transparent for decades in its interpretation of 
various matters of international law, including the law of the sea.211  The 
U.S. Government has effectuated such transparency by publishing its 
legal positions and explanations and widely disseminating those 
materials on the internet for the world to see.212  For example, documents 
such as the 1994 Transmittal Package that President Clinton submitted to 
the U.S. Senate regarding the ratification of UNCLOS included a forty-
seven-page, section-by-section “Commentary” of analysis and 
interpretation of the convention.213  The Chinese Government, however, 
                                            
 210. UNCLOS is not the first law of the sea convention that China has criticized as 
flawed.  See GREENFIELD, supra note 78, at 55 (“In a statement calling for a new and 
comprehensive convention to meet current needs, Chinese delegate Shen Wei-Liang said 
of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone that it contained many 
unjustifiable provisions, which only served to preserve certain interests.”). 
 211. See generally Carl-Sebastian Zoellner, Transperency: Analysis of an Evolving 
Fundemental Principal of International Economic Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 579, 594 
(2006). 
 212. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of State, Major State Dep’t Publications, U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/rls/dos/221.htm (last visited Apr. 22, 2012) 
(providing a directory of State Department papers). 
 213. See Clinton, UNCLOS Transmittal, supra note 67. 
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has not released any similar materials pertaining to its deliberations on 
and accession to UNCLOS in 1996.  If such documents exist, China 
should consider releasing these legal analyses to the public.214   
The United States has also disseminated publications providing the 
U.S. perspective on a wide range of international law issues, such as the 
U.S. Navy’s Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, a 
recurring twelve-chapter publication that includes four chapters focused 
on the law of the sea.215   The U.S. Navy has also published an 
Annotated Supplement to the Commander’s Handbook that provides 
specific citations to the legal and policy authorities from which its 
assertions or interpretations are derived.216  Additionally, the U.S. Navy 
has made strides toward increasing the worldwide accessibility of the 
Commander’s Handbook—a Spanish translation of the handbook is 
currently available217 and there are plans to translate it further into other 
languages.218  Admittedly, the PLA should be commended for publishing 
some manuals like Basics of International Law for Modern Soldiers.219  
But more is needed—similarly detailed annotations and translations of 
PLA manuals like Basics of International Law for Modern Soldiers 
would aid outsiders in better understanding China’s legal positions. 
Second, China’s Government could join the peaceful and 
professional efforts of the United States to challenge the excessive 
maritime claims of other nations; it is in China’s long-term interest to 
help preserve the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea around the world.  
As previously discussed in Part III.B of this Comment, the United States 
routinely issues diplomatic protests and conducts operational assertions 
against improperly drawn straight baselines, restrictions on the 
navigational right of innocent passage, unpermitted security restrictions 
on contiguous zones, and non-economic restrictions on exclusive 
economic zones.  As China’s PLA Navy continues to operate more 
                                            
 214. As the Author is unable to read Mandarin Chinese this criticism may be 
unfounded or inaccurate.  If any reader is aware of resources on law of the sea matters 
that have been published by China’s government, it is respectfully requested that the 
reader inform this Author at the email address provided at the outset of the article. 
 215. U.S. DEP’T OF NAVY ET AL., COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK, supra note 175.  
 216. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT TO THE COMMANDER’S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF 
NAVAL OPERATIONS (A. R. Thomas & James C. Duncan, eds. 1999), available at 
http://www.usnwc.edu/Research---Gaming/International-Law/RightsideLinks/Studies-
Series/documents/Navel-War-College-vol-73.aspx. 
 217. LEY DE OPERACIONES NAVALES MANUAL DEL COMANDANTE (2007), available at 
http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/f267a652-85d9-4fa9-b959-2665b61a0d32/NWP-1-
14M-(Spanish)1. 
 218. ROACH & SMITH, supra note 67, at 257. 
 219. BASICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR MODERN SOLDIERS, supra note 108. 
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globally, it could send a constructive message to other nations that China 
respects international law by peacefully and professionally challenging 
excessive maritime claims that contravene international law.  At the 
same time, however, China’s Government would need to reexamine its 
own excessive maritime claims. China must either rescind or modify 
those claims, or at least make honest efforts to justify them under 
international law in an open and detailed fashion. 
Third, the Chinese Government should go “on the record” and 
specifically explain its legal positions on many of the contested issues of 
international law, including those involving the law of the sea.  
Admittedly, China has made some efforts in the past ten years to be more 
transparent on some legal matters.  For example, the Chinese Journal of 
International Law includes not only law review articles by Chinese 
academics, but also occasionally public statements by PRC officials on 
matters involving international law as well as annual summaries of 
China’s practice in public international law.220  Official analyses or 
interpretations by the Chinese Government on issues like the purported 
authority to restrict military activities in its exclusive economic zone or 
the actual meaning and legal justification of its nine-dash line in the 
South China Sea would be a valuable overture to the global community 
and would demonstrate that China honestly believes that international 
law supports its position and that China is not being intentionally vague 
in order to hide the weaknesses of its legal arguments.  Additionally, 
China could make efforts to gather and publish its nation’s practices in a 
public international law journal.  But because this did not occur prior to 
the inaugural publication of the Chinese Journal of International Law in 
2001, foreign nations have neither an understanding nor appreciation for 
what customary international law developed in China prior to that year. 
Fourth, the Chinese Government should consider abandoning 
tenuous legal arguments.  When Chinese officials and academics take 
clauses of treaties out of context, ignore the negotiating history of 
treaties, or disregard a consensus view, China loses credibility with the 
global community.  That loss of credibility occurs not only with the 
specific issue at hand, but also with respect to China’s overall standing as 
a nation that claims to respect and strictly comply with international law.  
An effective trial advocate knows that successful advocacy for one’s 
client means picking one’s battles—that is, refraining from making every 
possible argument.  Similarly, a rising China should be confident enough 
                                            
 220. See About this Journal, CHINESE J. INT’L L., http://www.oxfordjournals.org/ 
our_journals/cjilaw/about.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2012). 
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to admit that the existing state of international law on a particular point is 
not on China’s side.   
Fifth, the Chinese Government should consider doing “over the 
table” what it is apparently attempting to do “under the table”—namely, 
changing the final text of UNCLOS.  As previously discussed, the 
Convention expressly allows state parties to propose amendments.  
Because China admitted before the ink fully dried on the 1982 text that 
the Convention was “imperfect” and had “serious drawbacks,”221 China 
would be well within its rights as a state party to propose amendments to 
correct the perceived imperfections.  Although other state parties might 
not support China’s proposed amendments, they would at least respect 
China for adhering to the procedural rule of law established in this 
international legal regime.   
Sixth, the Chinese Government should consider expressing its 
disfavor of other nation’s actions solely as a matter of policy, rather than 
as a matter of law.  Without mischaracterizing the lawful activities of 
other nations as illegal and undermining China’s credibility within the 
existing international legal order, China could diplomatically encourage 
other nations to modify their behavior, with the caveat that both sides 
should enter into any bilateral understandings voluntarily, absent undue 
pressure or coercion from China’s economic or military power.  
Moreover, the fact that China approaches another nation to reach such a 
common understanding does not mean that the other nation should, must, 
or will agree to do so.222  Regardless, the risk that China might fail to 
persuade another nation to reach such a bilateral diplomatic 
                                            
 221. See Gao, supra note 78, at 277. 
 222. See generally Patrick J. Neher et al., In Defense of High Seas Freedoms, RSIS 
COMMENTARIES, Mar. 24, 2009,  http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/ 
RSIS0312009.pdf, stating that:  
From the Chinese perspective, when they asked the US to stop surveillance 
activities in the East and South China Seas and the US refused, it signified a lack 
of respect.  The irony, of course, is that there is no surer sign of greatness in a 
nation or its Navy than to acknowledge and accept the exercise of navigational 
rights and freedoms by others.  But why shouldn’t the US curtail its military 
activities in and above the Chinese EEZ, in the interests of comity?   
 
The answer is two-fold.  First, it is an exceedingly thin line between comity and 
acquiescence to an excessive claim.  Second, the navigational rights and freedoms 
established in the law of the sea are fundamental to the maintenance of public 
order and the development of international trade upon which depends our shared 
economic prosperity.  As China expands its naval capability, we hope it will join 
other nations of the world as guarantors of freedoms of the seas. 
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understanding should not cause China to continue its self-discrediting 
rhetoric of assembling legal clauses to make political arguments. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
As a subspecialty of international law, the same rules of 
interpretation and modification and processes of development that apply 
to international law also apply to the law of the sea.  Pursuant to those 
rules and processes, a robust legal regime for the law of the sea has been 
developed; yet many of the existing realities of the law of the sea do not 
align with China’s desires. While China could have opted otherwise, it 
voluntarily chose to join UNCLOS in 1996 without simultaneously 
exercising its right to enter Declarations on some of the provisions of 
UNCLOS.  Rather than attempting to invalidate or unilaterally withdraw 
from UNCLOS, China appears to be addressing these disconnects 
through other means.  Specifically, China has employed a robust rhetoric 
on law of the sea matters—rhetoric which appears to be consistent with 
the existing international legal order, but which actually questions that 
order. 
The flaws in China’s rhetoric on law of the sea matters are 
significant.  China’s rhetoric is inconsistent with what China is saying to 
internal audiences; it ignores the reality that the United States has valued 
and upheld the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea guaranteed to all 
nations under international law; it disregards the reality that China poses 
a substantial risk to freedom of navigation, holding a “full house” of 
excessive claims in every possible maritime zone; it overlooks the reality 
that China has conducted and continues to conduct similar military 
activities in the exclusive economic zones of other nations; it exhibits a 
lack of transparency; and has also been less than trustworthy on 
statements of fact about recent incidents and misleading on citations to 
law.   
Some observers might consider China’s use of rhetoric to be “just 
words” with no actual effect.  But the reality is that this use of rhetoric is 
state action and can have negative effects, especially given that the goal 
of using legal rhetoric is to appear in compliance with an existing law, 
while actually exploiting that law by unilaterally changing it to the user’s 
benefit or advantage.  The potential second and third order effects are 
troubling.  If a nation such as China is allowed to play “fast and loose” 
with the standards and terminology of the established legal order, then 
other nations in the world might follow that negative example.  This 
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could result in an “arms race”223 of legal warfare—where rival nations 
increase the quantity or quality of legal restraints in attempts to deter, 
deny, or dominate rival nations.  The innocent victim or collateral 
damage in such legal warfare is the rule of law itself.  Bodies of law, 
such as that reflected in UNCLOS, were the product of years of intense, 
but peaceful, negotiations by many nations.  Hence, the world cannot 
afford to allow one nation, or a handful of nations, to disregard their 
legal obligations merely because it is not “perfect” in their self-interested 
eyes.  Despite China’s highly-concerning use of rhetoric on law of the 
sea matters, there are ways that China could reassure the world in the 
immediate future  that it does, in fact, respect international law, including 
the law of the sea. 
Ultimately, representatives and supporters of China might take 
umbrage with one or more assertions throughout this Article.  The 
response to such umbrage is this:  Alternative views from China are 
welcome and encouraged—so long as they provide specific 
disagreements and detailed law-based explanations, instead of simply 
providing more rhetorical and recycled platitudes.  Only then can any 
legal discussion, official or otherwise, advance beyond recurring talking 
points toward a truly “mature” dialogue.   
At the same time, those in China must understand and appreciate that 
the truth of the assertions in this Article are, to some extent, immaterial.  
In other words, the legal advisors in China’s Government might very 
well have developed and already possess on file detailed analysis 
underlying their legal conclusions on some of its law of the sea issues.  
Trust, and more importantly, mistrust is often a matter of perception.  If 
China continues not to share its legal analysis of international law issues 
                                            
 223. See, e.g., Bradford A. Lee, Arms Race, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/ 
topics/arms-race (last visited Feb. 9, 2012).  
Over the past century, the arms race metaphor has assumed a prominent place in 
public discussion of military affairs.  But even more than the other colorful 
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between rivals or in a decision by one side to moderate its buildup. 
Id.  
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with the world, other nations will continue to interpret such opaqueness 
in the worst possible light, adding to their express concerns over whether 
they can ever trust China.  
Absent China changing its course in substantive ways like those 
suggested in this Article, the author is concerned that the global 
community of nations will continue to perceive China as attempting to 
unilaterally rewrite or manipulate an established body of international 
law and restrict the lawful uses of the oceans—all while it rhetorically 
reassures the world, in the words of Director-General Duan, that China 
“strictly complies” with that body of law.  That duplicity, actual or 
perceived, will continue until the nations of the world, individually and 
collectively, send a consistent message to China:  Rhetoric about 
international law means nothing.  Genuine respect for the law, and 
actions that demonstrate compliance with the law, is what matters most. 
  
